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This study investigates the rationale behind acquisitions through tender offers by 
examining unsuccessful tender offers from 1985 to 2010. Four hypotheses are 
tested: information, synergy, agency and hubris. The study follows the approach 
in Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) (BDK) and builds on their analysis by 
implementing the recent methodological advances in long run analysis. The 
proportion of unsuccessful acquisitions has declined significantly from 20 percent 
in 1985 to 5 percent in 2010. Contrary to the evidence presented in BDK, the 
results support both the information and synergy hypotheses. The study also 
examines correlations among target gain, total gain and acquirer gain to 
differentiate between synergy, agency and hubris hypotheses. The results suggest 
that, in addition to synergy, agency considerations have become increasingly 
important in explaining the unsuccessful acquisitions via tender offers in our 
sample period. We find no evidence in support of the hubris hypothesis. Cross-
sectional analysis shows that the intensity of M&A activity in the target's industry, 
pre-announcement price run-up in the target, firm size, and absence of a poison 
pill provision increase the likelihood of unsuccessful targets being acquired within 
5 years of the initial bid. Additionally, this study also finds by comparing 
unsuccessful initial bidders to their counterpart winning rival bidders that, bidders 
of larger size, more growth opportunities, and bidders in unrelated industries to 
that of the target and in less active M&A industries, are more likely to succeed in 
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1. Introduction   
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) (BDK) examine the returns to shareholders for 
both target firms that received unsuccessful tender offers and acquiring firms that 
made failed tender offers, and conclude that the rationale for tender offers is 
synergy and not the information impact of the revaluation of the targets’ value. 
According to BDK, there are two main hypotheses which explain the rationale 
behind tender offers, information and synergy. The information hypothesis posits 
that the information of the acquisition announcement causes the market to revalue 
the “undervalued” targets. And, it could also inspire the target’s management to 
implement better operating strategies to increase shareholder value. In either case, 
the positive abnormal returns should not be influenced whether the acquisition is 
successful or not. Consequently, the stock price should not decrease after the 
announcement of the unsuccessful tender offers. On the other hand, the synergy 
hypothesis states that positive abnormal returns come from the transfer of the 
target resources and reallocation, such as more efficient management, 
complementary resources, economies of scale, etc. Hence targets that are 
successfully acquired in tender offers provide synergistic gains to the acquiring 
firm, while targets that are not acquired in unsuccessful tender offers should have 
these potential synergy gains dissipate after the bid fails. Consequently, 
announcement period abnormal returns will decline after the announcement since 
there is no synergy in the unsuccessful cases.  
In order to determine which hypothesis is the dominant motive for acquisitions 
through tender offers, BDK test the long-term abnormal returns gained by the 
unsuccessful targets, which were grouped by whether they were acquired within 5 
years after the first unsuccessful bid. The results show that the positive abnormal 
returns gained from the announcement of tender offers dissipated in cases when 
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the targets were not acquired within 5 years, suggesting that the continuous 
improvement of the firm’s value occurs only when the target’s resources can 
result in synergistic gains for the acquirer, in which case the initial failed bid 
could be followed by another higher premium bid. If information hypothesis holds, 
the stock price of the unsuccessful targets should not decrease back to its 
preannouncement level even though these firms were not acquired within 5 years. 
BDK also investigate the failed acquiring firms by categorizing them into two 
groups based on who they eventually lost to: the management of the targets or a 
rival bidder. They find that the announcement period cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for bidders who lost to the management of the target, return to the pre-
announcement level, while for failed bidders who lost to rivals, the CARs 
decrease sharply. These results further support their finding that the acquirers who 
lost to the rival bidders suffered the loss because the rival bidders gained synergy 
from the acquisitions. According to these results, the authors conclude that the 
acquisitions via tender offers were implemented by acquiring firms in order to get 
synergies, and the positive response on target stock at the announcement is not 
simply the result of new information about target undervaluation. 
The BDK study is now 30 years old and fairly dated. The tender offers 
investigated in their paper were from 1963-1980. A number of significant changes 
have occurred both in the merger and acquisition market as well as the 
methodologies used in the literature. For example, the proportion of tender offers 
in all M&A transactions has decreased as well as the possibility of unsuccessful 
bids. Whereas 20 percent of the tender offer bids were unsuccessful in the mid-
1980s, that number has dropped to less than 5 percent in the most recent years. 
The greater likelihood of success may be due to improved diligence on the part of 
acquirers (due to either improvements in management quality, or greater 
availability of time and information accuracy of targets) and the trend towards 
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more related acquisitions compared to the diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Secondly, there has been a significant shift in the ownership structure 
of publicly traded corporations in the United States. Institutional ownership has 
increased from less than 25 percent in the 1980s to over 50 percent, and this has 
important implications in terms of monitoring managerial decisions. Thirdly, the 
introduction of anti-takeover provisions, such as poison pills, staggered board, 
and others introduced in the early 1980s has made acquisitions difficult, 
particularly if the target’s management is not fully on board. The increased 
success rate for tender offers is also in part a result of the drop in unsolicited 
offers.   
In addition to the changes in the M&A landscape, there have been significant 
advances made in finance research methodologies. Both the short-run and long-
run event studies have evolved substantially in the last three decades. In the BDK 
study, Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) analyses are performed on shares of 
the target firms to show the long-term effects of unsuccessful tender offers. We 
now know the shortcomings of using CARs for long event windows. Kothari and 
Warner (2006) point out that, contrary to short-horizon tests which show little or 
no sensitivity to model misspecification and have a high power, long-horizon tests 
are problematic and have low power. Using simple CARs to study long horizon 
returns is problematic in terms of the distributional assumptions of stock returns 
and the associated tests statistics. Improved methods such as those introduced by 
Barber and Lyon (1997), and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) have become standard 
in long- horizon studies.    
There have also been advances in corporate finance theory, such as the 
development of the agency theory of free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) and the 
introduction of hubris hypothesis (Roll (1986)) since the BDK study. Agency 
theory states that the management of acquiring firms implement the acquisition to 
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maximize their own benefits at the expense of the shareholders. Hubris hypothesis 
suggests that the management of the bidders making acquisitions make mistakes 
in valuing the target firms, resulting in overpaying for the acquisition and gain no 
synergy. According to Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) (BN), who develop a 
unique approach using the target gain, acquirer gain and total gain to distinguish 
the synergy, agency and hubris motives in an acquisition, the rationale is that if 
the acquisition is motived by synergy, target gain should be positively related to 
both acquirer gain and total gain; if the acquisition is motived by an agency 
problem, target gain should be negatively related to both total gain and acquirer 
gain because when the targets’ shareholders predict the acquirers’ motives, they 
would try to gain more wealth, which comes from the loss of the acquirers; if the 
acquisition is motived by hubris, there would in most cases be no correlation 
between target gain and total gain because the wealth of the acquirers is 
transferred simply to target gain since the acquisition are based on erroneous data 
or assumptions.  
Taking into consideration both the developments in the merger and acquisition 
market as well as the advances in financial research, we re-examine unsuccessful 
tender offers using a more recent sample between 1985 and 2010. We adopt the 
basic approach as in BDK and build on it by implementing the more recent 
techniques to analyze long run returns. For the long horizon returns, we use the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
suggest that the BHAR approach is more reliable since it assumes that multi-year 
abnormal returns are independent for event firms. Additionally, we consider not 
only synergy and information hypothesis as in the BDK paper, but also 
investigate agency and hubris as potential motives for tender offers. Also of note 
and of significance, BDK investigate all the unsuccessful control-oriented tender 
offers, including partial acquisitions. In this new investigation, we focus on the 
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unsuccessful tender offer in which the acquirer attempted to gain 100 percent of 
the target. 
To distinguish between the different motives for acquisitions, we follow the 
methodology described in BN’s study and measure the correlation among target 
gain, total gain and acquirer gain in order to investigate the synergy, agency and 
hubris motives. In a second stage, we also investigate firm characteristics that 
determine if the unsuccessful targets have a stronger likelihood of being acquired 
shortly after initial unsuccessful tender offer. Like in the BDK study, we also 
compare the unsuccessful acquirers and the successful rival bidders to determine 
which characteristics influence the success of the acquisitions. 
Our empirical results show that in tender offers, on average, the shareholders of 
target firms that rejected the initial tender offers gain positive abnormal returns.  
In the short term, firms that were 100 percent acquired within 1 year of the initial 
unsuccessful tender offers gained more wealth than the firms that were not 
acquired within a year. These results support both information and synergy 
hypotheses. Additionally, our empirical results indicate that the stock price starts 
to decrease after the gain around the announcement month. In the long term, the 
stock price of targets that were acquired within 5 years only increases in the 
period around announcement month, while it subsequently decreases in the next 5 
years. Meanwhile for firms that were not acquired within 5 years, the trend shows 
the stock price increases at announcement month and subsequently keeps its high 
level for the next 5 years. These results differ from the results in the BDK study, 
which shows that the stock price of the firms that were acquired within 5 years 
kept a high level in the next 5 years, while the stock price of the firms that were 
not acquired within 5 years decreases to the pre-announcement level. In contrast 
to the evidence presented in BDK, our result supports the information hypothesis 
in the “not acquired within 5 years” sample, because if information hypothesis 
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holds, the stock price of targets should not decrease after the revaluation of the 
firms, even if the tender offers are rejected.  
We also observe that acquirers that made unsuccessful tender offers suffer from 
shareholder wealth losses. The stock price of unsuccessful acquirers, irrespective 
of whether they lost to the target management or a rival bidder, increases around 
announcement period, but then decreases quickly once the likelihood of the bid 
succeeding diminishes. Additionally, stock price in neither group returns to pre-
announcement level.  This appears to support synergy hypothesis, as unsuccessful 
acquirers lost wealth when market realizes the bid will fail.  Again, contrary to the 
evidence in the BDK study, in our sample the acquirers that lost to management 
(“no change in control” sample) lost more than the acquirers that lost to the rival 
bidders (“change in control” sample).  It suggests that synergy is not the dominant 
motive for tender offers since if synergy dominates, the acquirers that lost to rival 
bidders should suffer more as the rival bidders gain the beneficial resources of the 
target. The evidence indicates a shift in the motives for the acquisition in the more 
recent period.  We then investigate if agency has become a more important reason 
for unsuccessful tender offers in the recent period. Noting that the proportion of 
unsuccessful acquisitions has declined to 5 percent from 20 percent in the 1980s, 
it is possible that most acquisitions where synergy plays a more important role are 
successful where acquirers exercise more due diligence, leaving agency as a 
significant motive in the small proportion of unsuccessful acquisitions. The 
regressions of the target gain against acquirer gain and total gain, according to BN, 
explain our results. For the firms that made unsuccessful bids, target gain is 
positively related to total gain and negatively related to acquirer gain. After we 
implement the regressions in “positive total gains” and “negative total gains” 
groups, we find the correlation between target gain and acquirer gain are even 
more negative in the “negative total gains” sample, while it is not significantly 
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different to zero in the “positive total gains” sample. We conclude that agency 
problem is a major reason for unsuccessful tender offers during our sample period. 
The significant and positive correlation between target gain and total gain rejects 
the hubris hypothesis since hubris suggests no correlation between target gain and 
total gain. For the rival bidders that made successful acquisitions, the positive 
correlations between target gain and acquirer gain and between target gain and 
total gain suggest that the motive behind the successful acquisitions is synergy. 
Thus, while the initial bidder lost, the successful rival bidder gained control of the 
target and realized the potential synergy gains from the combination. 
Furthermore, we also find that if the unsuccessful target firms belong to an 
industry where the M&A activity is high, or if the target firms have more price 
run-up in 11 to 210 days before announcement date of the tender offers, they have 
a greater likelihood of getting acquired within 12 months, while absence of poison 
pills, greater firm size and a more active M&A industry make the unsuccessful 
targets more likely to be acquired within 5 years. On the other hand, the 
comparison of the unsuccessful acquirers to the rival bidders suggests that the 
likelihood of the success of tender offer is also related to the characteristics of the 
acquirers. On average, larger firms, firms with higher Tobin’s q and higher 
diversification in less active M&A industry have a greater chance for a successful 
bid. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an 
overview of the related literature on tender offers, followed by the hypotheses. 
Section 4 provides the description of the data. Section 5 describes the 
methodology and section 6 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 7 




2. Literature Review 
2.1 Rationale for tender offers 
Numerous empirical researches investigate the rationales for tender offers and 
state four main hypotheses: information, synergy, agency and hubris. Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) argue that the theory of acquisitions improving efficiency is 
considerable but also incomplete. Since the financial market is not always 
efficient, some firms are undervalued at some points in time. Therefore, some 
transactions are also motivated by market valuation. According to this theory, the 
acquisition bid could result in the market revaluing the targets, referred to as the 
information hypothesis. Hence, according to information hypothesis, the gain 
from acquisitions through tender offers has a relation to the undervaluation of the 
stock or the management of the targets, regardless of acquisition success or failure.  
In addition, Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) conclude that the independent 
outside directors improve the return for the target shareholders. Cotter, Shivdasani 
and Zenner also conclude, the greater the number of independent directors, the 
greater the possibility of anti-takeover provisions.  
However, Brush (1996) calculates the predictions of changes in performance for 
each target from 1980 to 1984 and puts importance on the resource sharing and 
activity sharing in the acquisitions. Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) 
investigate the impact of the synergy in acquisition and confirm that synergy, 
which comes from the “operational, financial and managerial” sources, creates 
abnormal returns for targets, acquiring firms, or sometimes both. Seth, Song and 
Pettit (2000) examine the foreign acquisition of US firms and argue that the 
synergy hypothesis is the principal explanation for the improvement of value for 




Furthermore, some studies find evidence to support in favour of the agency 
hypothesis. Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasize the important of agency 
problem. Holl and Kyriazis (1997) investigate 178 successful takeover bids in UK, 
and find that managers have preference on the diversification, where 
diversification has quadratic relation with profitability. Hence when management 
chooses too much diversification over the point where marginal cost of 
diversification equals to marginal benefits, the profitability falls. They in turn 
conclude that considerable synergy was found in their sample, while agency 
problem exists in takeovers. Gondhalekar and Sant (2004) find that over-invested 
firms pay higher premium to win the acquisitions while under-invested firms pay 
less, and the premium is inversely related to the returns for the acquirers which 
indicates that agency rather than synergy or hubris has a stronger influence on 
merger premium. 
In addition, hubris is also an important potential reason for takeovers. Hayward 
and Hambrick (1997) investigate a sample of 106 large acquisitions and find that 
CEO hubris is highly associated with the premium in acquisitions. The greater the 
CEO hubris, the greater the premium paid by acquirers and the greater the cost to 
the shareholders. Seth, Song and Pettit (2000) study foreign acquisitions of US 
firms and point that synergy is the dominant motive for acquisition, while hubris 
exists when total gains are negative and agency exists when total gains are 
positive. Furthermore, Raj and Forsyth (2003) examine the performance of the 
bidders with hubris management in the United Kingdom during 1990s and use 
accounting ratios and bid premium to show that hubris acquirers make mistakes in 




2.2 Shifts in the M&A Market 
BDK study the tender offers from 1963 to 1980, which is quite dated.  Much has 
changed in the market for corporate control since then. 
Prior to 1980, the proportion of institutional investor ownership was low. For 
instance “by 1950, [institutional investors] owned only 7% of US equities and 
[the percentage was] certainly even less in other countries.” (Google). According 
to Duggal and Millar (1999), institutional ownership improved rapidly and 
institutional investors “may now be holding [as much as] 46.5% of the 
outstanding common stock of U.S. corporations.” The role of institutional 
investors is very important because they hold a considerable amount of capital 
and they have more investment knowledge. Taking this into consideration, they 
tend to have tremendous influence on other investors. Empirical evidence also 
shows that the gains for efficient bidders are greater than those for inefficient 
bidders [Lang (1989), Servaes (1991)]. Thus, it is reasonable for us to expect for 
the last three decades that when the percentage of the institutional ownership 
increased, it would potentially impact the acquisition decisions of firms as well. 
Furthermore, several anti-takeover provisions, such as poison pill, staggered 
board, Pac-Man defense, etc., have been implemented broadly following the 
1980s. For example, the Poison Pill and Pac-Man were invented in 1982 as a 
defense to hostile takeovers. Following this, takeover defenses were broadly used 
to resist the tender offers. Anti-takeover provisions have a significant impact 
acquisition decisions. Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) point that the 
existence of poison pill and other anti-takeover provisions increased the premium 
and shareholders’ gains for targets. 
In addition, in the evolving M&A landscape, the type of acquisitions has changed 
tremendously since the 1980s. According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), whereas 
in the 1960s, mergers usually involved firms in different industries, which is 
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called “conglomerate” wave; in the 1980s, many acquirers were financiers, and 
they usually paid by cash, which is referred to as the “hostile” takeover; in the 
1990s, the acquisitions occurred within the same industry, an emphasis on 
corporate focus, and the type of the payment was mostly by stock. Studies also 
find that the acquisitions in the later period are more successful than the earlier 
period [Lichetenberg and Siegel (1989)].  
 
2.3 Advances in finance methodologies  
Of great importance, long-term event study has been significantly improved over 
time. According to Kothari and Warner (2006), over the past 30 years significant 
improvements have occurred in the long-horizon event study. The change 
primarily relates to how abnormal returns are estimated and their significance 
tested. This change also reflects a new finding in the late 1990s. Even though the 
short-term event study shows “cleanest evidence we have on efficiency” [Fama 
(1991)], Brown and Warner (1980) warned about the reliability of long-horizon 
event study. While short-horizon event studies are well-specified, the same is not 
the case with long-term event studies.  
There are two widely used modified methods for long-term event study at current, 
Calendar-time Portfolio approach and BHAR (buy-and-hold abnormal returns) 
approach. The Calender-time Portfolio approach [Fama (1998)] has been used, for 
example by Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000). The BHAR approach, which is also 
called the characteristic-based matching approach, is widely used in the recent 
years, such as in Ritter (1991), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) and 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
Since the BDK approach makes use of returns to shareholders of unsuccessful 
targets and acquirers over the long-term, it is important to address methodological 
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issues related to long horizon studies. We employ the current advances in 
estimating long horizon returns to study the rationale of tender offers.  
 
2.4 Methods to distinguish different motives 
A number of empirical studies investigate the motives of takeovers. BN (1993) 
implement a new method to distinguish between the different motives. They 
calculate the correlation between the target gain, acquirer gain and total gain in 
pars to distinguish the three motives of takeovers: synergy, agency and hubris. 
According to BN, the target gain, acquirer gain and total gain are calculated by: 
“The target gain is [calculated] by multiplying the target’s CAR [with] the market 
value of the target firm’s equity [at] the end of six trading days prior to the first 
announcement for the target, minus the value of the target shares held by the 
acquirer. The acquirer gain is [calculated] by multiplying the acquirer’s CAR 
[with] the market value of the acquiring firm [at] the end of six trading days prior 
to the announcement [being] made by the acquiring firm. The total gain is the sum 
of the target [gain] and acquirer [gain].”  
Following the examination of 330 tender offers in the time period between 1963 
and 1988, they find that in the acquisitions in which the total gains are positive, 
the most important motive is synergy, while in the acquisitions in which the total 
gains are negative, the primary motive is agency. 





2.5 Characteristics of the firms  
The characteristics of the firms involved may be a major factor in the success or 
failure of acquisition bids. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) show that firms with 
more antitakeover provisions gain lower abnormal returns during the 
announcement period. They state that in addition to antitakeover provisions, other 
firms’ characteristics can influence the abnormal returns for firms as well, such as 
firm size, Tobin’s q, leverage, free cash flow and stock price run-up, where stock 
price run-up is calculated for the time period 11 to 210 days prior to the 
announcement day. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) examine 12,023 
acquisitions made by public firms and find that small firms have better 
performance in acquisitions than large firms. Large firms tend to provide higher 
premium for the bid. Stulz and Walkling (1989) argue that shareholders of the 
bidders with higher Tobin’s q gain more wealth than the shareholders of the 
bidders with lower Tobin’s q from an investigation of successful tender offers. 
Jensen (1986) points out a free cash flow theory about takeovers. Masulis, Wang 
and Xie (2007) (MWX) suggest that leverage could reduce free cash flow and 
limit the targets’ premium, and it could encourage the management to improve the 
performance of acquirers. Additionally, MWX also control the stock price run-up 
before the announcement in order to separate the effect of the antitakeover 
provisions.  
Following on MWX, we also measure these characteristics to investigate which 
characteristics influence the performance of the unsuccessful targets and acquirers 







In this paper, four hypotheses are tested for the sample of unsuccessful tender 
offers. These include information, synergy, agency and hubris. The empirical 
implications for shareholder wealth for each is discussed below. 
 
3.1 Information hypothesis: 
Information hypothesis posits that abnormal return on the announcement date is 
due to revelation of new information on the undervalued target and inspiration to 
the target’s management to improve their operating strategies of increasing 
shareholder’s wealth. Therefore, if the targets’ stock price increase is due to 
revaluation of targets or improved operating strategies, stock price should not 
decrease back to the pre-announcement level even if the acquisitions are not 
successful. 
 
3.2 Synergy hypothesis 
Synergy hypothesis is often cited as one of the main motives of tender offers. 
Synergy hypothesis posits that the positive abnormal returns from tender offers 
derive the transfer of target’s resources. Hence, unsuccessful tender offers should 
not create positive abnormal returns since there is no target’s resources relocated 
to acquirers. Following BDK, the stock price of unsuccessful targets, which were 
not acquired within 5 years, should decrease to pre-announcement level because 
unsuccessful bids can create no synergy. Furthermore, unsuccessful acquirers who 
lost to rival bidders should suffer more loss than unsuccessful acquirers who lost 
to management of targets because rival bidders gain synergy from the successful 
tender offers. In addition, per BN, synergy hypothesis assumes that managers of 
both targets and acquirers engage acquisitions in order to maximize wealth of 
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shareholders. Thus acquisitions would occur only if there are positive gains for 
both side of shareholders. Therefore, target gain, acquirer gain and total gain 
should be positively related to each other. 
 
 3.3 Agency hypothesis 
Agency hypothesis suggests that management of acquirers engage takeover 
activities in order to maximize their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. 
According to BN when the targets realize that the management of acquirers 
implement tender offers with the purpose of increasing their own benefits but not 
shareholder’s wealth, they will try to gain more wealth from the tender offers. 
This will give targets more bargaining power to obtain more value from the 
management of acquirers. Therefore, the more serious agency problem is, the 
more value targets will gain through the tender offers. Also greater appropriation 
of acquirers’ management will intrigue greater loss of total gain and acquirer gain. 
Thus target gain should be negatively related to both total gain and acquirer gain. 
 
 3.4 Hubris hypothesis 
The hubris hypothesis suggests that acquirers attempt acquisitions based on 
mistakenly estimation of target’s value and that there is no synergy created by 
acquisitions. As stated by BN, since synergy is assumed to be zero, the value that 
targets gain is simply the value transferred from acquirers to targets. Therefore, if 
hubris is the main motive of tender offers, total gain should be zero, and target 
gain should be negatively related to acquirer gain. Consequently, target gain 





Following BDK, we investigate returns from the unsuccessful control-oriented 
tender offers for target firms and acquiring firms for the time period between 
1985 and 2010. Of notable difference from the BDK study, the control-oriented 
tender offers is defined as one in which the acquiring firms held less than 50% of 
target shares, and wanted to own 100% of shares after acquisition. Additionally, 
the subsequent successful acquisitions are the ones in which the bidders gained 
100% of shares of acquired firms.  
The primary database of the study in this paper includes 2,669 tender offers in the 
time period between 1985 and 2010. Among the tender offers, CRSP data was 
available for 2,356 of tender offers, 1619 of which were control-oriented tender 
offers with either the target or bidder public. The tender offers were collected 
from the SDC Platinum database, which provides information about Mergers & 
Acquisitions. Relative data for our tender offers were obtained from Nexis-Lexis, 
CRSP (Centre for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago) and 
COMPUSTAT. 
Of particular note, in our study we concentrate on the pure complete acquisitions, 
in other words we focus on the acquisitions in which acquiring firms sought to 
own 100% of their target’s shares firstly in failed bids, and secondly rival 
acquiring firms owned 100% of target’s shares in subsequent successful bids. In 
the sample of the target firms, the unsuccessful target firms that were sought for 
full acquisition is 240, of which 113 are completely acquired within 1 year and 
145 are completely acquired within 5 years.  
In the sample of bidders, the sample of public acquiring firms yields 1,190 tender 
offers, 874 of which are control-oriented tender offers. Some acquirers made 
multiple tender offers at the same time and were deleted. The sample of unique 
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tender offers is 774. If an acquiring firm initially failed but subsequently 
succeeded to gain the control of targets, it is treated as a multi-bid successful 
acquisition effort, or success on the part of the acquirer. Overall, we have a 
sample of 137 unique firms that made 147 unsuccessful bids (6 firms made two 
different unsuccessful acquisitions and 2 firms made three different unsuccessful 
acquisitions). Only 139 cases have data on CRSP. 
In this analysis, the unsuccessful bidders are categorized into two groups. In one 
group, 76 bidders lost to the management of targets, which means the control of 
targets did not change; in another group, 63 bidders lost bids to rival bidders, 
meaning that control of targets was lost to rival bidders. The rival bidding firms 
are defined as the firms that won the bid within the unsuccessful bidders’ tender 
offer period. The tender offer period is from the day of the announcement of 
unsuccessful tender offer bid to 3 weeks following the expiration day of the 
unsuccessful tender offers. In this analysis, either the announcement date or the 
effective date of the successful acquisition was in the tender offer period, we treat 
the bidder as rival bidder.  
To put the proportion of unsuccessful tender offers into context, we also collect 
all control-oriented M&As and group them as successful and unsuccessful for 
each year during the period between 1985 and 2010. The trend for successful and 
unsuccessful M&As is demonstrated in Figure 1. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
From Figure 1, we can see that the success rate of the M&A is increasing over 
time, which accounts for relatively a small number of 240 unsuccessful target 
firms in the sample. Additionally, though not shown, we also observed that the 
number of M&A increased from 1112 (1985) to 7042 (1998) and then decreased 
to 2696 (2010). 
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From the control-oriented tender offers from the control-oriented M&A each year 
in the same period, it can also be seen that the percentage of tender offers 
decreased dramatically from prior period and up to 1988, and after. This can be 
observed in Figure 2: 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
It can be seen from Figure 2 that the percentage of tender offers in M&A 
generally increases from 1985 to 1989, then decreases quite sharply after 1989. 
Notably since the tender offers in this analysis are from 1985 and 2010, it 
explains the small number of unsuccessful tender offers in our sample. 
 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns to unsuccessful targets 
In order to determine whether synergy or information that more greatly impacts 
tender offers, we closely examine the returns to shareholders of firms in the 
following 5 years after announcement of the failed bid. 
In order to obtain the returns of unsuccessfully target firms, this study uses the 
BHAR (Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return) method to obtain the cumulative 
abnormal returns in long-horizon. For each firm in the sample, the monthly 
holding period returns are obtained from the announcement month to the 60th 
month following on CRSP. The monthly data is used as we want to perform the 
long-term event study with this 5-year time block. For each firm, 3 methods are 
implemented to find a firm that is most like the target firm, or “matching firm”. In 
the first method we select the firm that is in the same industry as the target and 
whose market value (size) is closest to that of the target firm. In the second 
method we select the firm that is in the same industry as the target and whose 
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book-to-market (b/m) value is closest to that of the target firm. In the third 
method firms which are simple in the target firm’s industry are chosen first. Then, 
we select the ten firms that have closet market value with the targets’. Within 
these ten firms, the matching firm is the one that has closest book-to-market value. 
The market value of equity is measured from the database of CRSP and the book 
value of equity is obtained from COMPUSTAT. The industry information is the 
SIC code on the CRSP, grouped by Fama-French 12 factories. 
After getting the matching firm for each target firm, the monthly holding period 
return is collected for each of them at the same time period as the target firm, and 
this is retained as a benchmark. Then a T-month BHAR for event firm is defined 
with the following formula: 
BHARi(t,T)=∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1   - ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1  
Where BHARi(t,T) is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for firm i in window (t,T); 
Ri,t is the monthly holding period return for the unsuccessful target; 
Rbenchmark,t is the monthly holding period return for the matching firm. 
 
Where the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return should be calculated by: 






Where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(𝑡, 𝑇)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return for window (t,T); 
N is the number of firms in window (t,T). 
 
5.2 Short-horizon event study for sample of unsuccessful acquirers 
For the firms that made unsuccessful tender offers, we examine the CAR 
(cumulative abnormal returns) in order to distinguish between information and 
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synergy hypotheses. The methodology used here is the short-horizon event study 
and we use the daily time-frame to obtain the abnormal return. The cumulative 
abnormal returns are measured by 20 days prior to the announcement of the 
unsuccessful bid to 180 days following. The announcement day of the initial 
unsuccessful tender offer is event day 0. 
Here, we use returns from day -255 to – 46 to estimate the parameters for market 
model: 
Rit=𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡, t = -255, …, -46 
Where: 
Rit= daily stock return for firm i in day t;  
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡=daily stock return for market portfolio in day t relative to the failed tender 
offer i; 
𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 = parameters; 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term, which is assumed to have mean 0 ad variance 𝜎𝑖
2 
The abnormal return for firm i should be calculated as: 
ARit= Rit - ?̂?𝑖 - ?̂?𝑖Rmit 
Where  ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 are estimated of  𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 separately.  
The CAR (cumulative abnormal return) for the portfolio of the failed acquiring 









t0= first event day; 
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T= event day through which the CAR is calculated; 
Nt = number of firms in day t. 
 
5.3 Cross Section Regression Analysis 
In this part of the analysis, the unsuccessful targets are divided into two groups. In 
one group, the targets are 100% acquired within 1 year or 5 years; in the second 
group, the targets are not acquired within 1 year or 5 years. In order to discern 
which characteristic(s) influence the unsuccessful targets being acquired 




1 +  e−(b0+ b1SB+ b2Poison+ b3Size + b4Q+ b5LEVR + b6FCF+ b7Industry + b8runup)
 
According to Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), the variables are defined as follows:  
Y: Dummy variable, which equals to 1 when the target was 100% acquired within 
1 year or 5 years, separately, after the announcement of the initial unsuccessful 
bid; 0 otherwise; 
SB: Dummy variable of Staggered Board, which equals to 1 when the board of 
target firm is classified; 0 otherwise; 
Poison: Dummy variable of Poison pill, which equals to 1 when the firm has 
poison pill as antitakeover provision; 0 otherwise;  
Size: Log of book value of total assets; 
Q: Tobin’s q, which is market value of assets divided by book value of assets; 
Besides, the market value of asset is calculated by: 
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Market value of asset = book value of assets – book value of common equity + 
market value of common equity. 
LEVR: Leverage, which is book value of (long term debts + short term debts) 
divided by market value of total assets; 
FCF: Free Cash Flow, which is measured as: (Operating income before 
depreciation – interest expenses-income taxes-capital expenditures) / book value 
of total assets; 
Industry: Industry M&A, which is defined as the deal value of all M&A deals in 
the initial unsuccessful target’s industry and year / total book value of assets of all 
COMPUSTAT firms in the same industry in the same year. 
Runup: is stock price runup, which is defined as the target’s buy-and-hold 
abnormal return during the period (-210,-11); 
Then we compare the characteristics of the unsuccessful acquiring firms and the 
successful rival firms in order to discern which factors mostly influence the 
successful acquisitions.  
The main characteristics considered are staggered board, firm size, Tobin’s q, 
leverage, free cash flow, industry M&A, stock price runup, diversification, 
relative size and management quality. 
Diversification is defined as dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the bidder and 
the target do not share a Fama-French 12 industry and 0 otherwise; 
Relative size is defined as deal value over bidder market value of equity. (Market 
value of equity= shares outstanding * stock price) 
Management quality is measured by the operating income growth rate, which is 
defined as (EBITDAt-1 – EBITDAt-4)/EBITDAt-4, adjusted for the industry median. 
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6.1 Unsuccessful targets acquired within 1 year 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Table 1 shows the number of unsuccessful targets in total sample, “subsequently 
acquired within 1 year” and “not acquired within 1 year” subsamples in each 
month after announcement of unsuccessful tender offers. Column 2, 3 and 4 show 
the number of the firms in each month after announcement of the initial tender 
offer for each sample. Total sample in column 1 includes 240 unsuccessful targets 
in tender offers between 1985 and 2010. The total sample are divided into 
“subsequently acquired within 1 year” sample, which includes 109 targets, and 
“not acquired within 1 year” sample, which includes 131 targets. From column 3 
we see that the number of firms decreases with time from 109 to 1 (event month 
11) because the targets, which were acquired, are absorbed after the second 
successful acquisition since we concentrate on the 100% acquisitions for the 
subsequently successful deals. 
The BHARs to shareholders of unsuccessful targets in total sample, “acquired 
within 1 year” and “not acquired within 1 year” subsamples are shown in Table 2. 
In Table 2, the matching firms are selected by the market value of equity (size) 
and industry here. The matching firm is selected when the acquiring firm was in 
the same industry as the unsuccessful target and had the closest market value to 
the target in the 3 months before the tender offer announcement month. Column 5 
is the comparison of BHAR to the unsuccessful targets in both subsamples. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
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The data in Table 2 is plotted in Figure 3. 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
In this part, we only present the results to 11 months following the announcement 
date because the targets which were acquired within 1 year are absorbed after the 
second successful tender offer since we concentrate on the 100% acquisitions for 
the subsequently successful deals. Table 1 shows that the number of firms left in 
each time window decreases sharply, clearly indicating that the acquisitions 
happen fairly soon following the initial failed by the initial bidder. There is only 1 
firm which is acquired 100% in the 11 month up to announcement month. We 
focus our discussion only on the results of the first 8 months for accuracy 
purposes because we can see there were only 7 firms left by the month 9 and 
fewer subsequently.  
Similar to the evidence reported in BDK, the results above show that on average, 
the target firms all gained significant positive abnormal returns in the first 8 
months from the month of the announcement of the tender offers. In the sample of 
total unsuccessful targets, the buy-and-hold abnormal return is significantly 
positive in the next 8 months after the announcement month (event month) of the 
tender offers but there is a decreasing trend. Table 2 Column 1 shows that BHAR 
increases from 33.72% (0 to 0) to 35.53% (0 to +1), while decreases subsequently 
to 17.87% (0 to +8). However, even though the BHAR decreases persistently after 
the announcement month, it is still significantly above 0. These results show that 
shareholders of targets realize significant positive abnormal return through tender 
offers, regardless of tender offer success. This indicates that the information of the 
announcement of tender offers causes revaluation of target firms, which results in 
the persistent run-up of the target stock price. 
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If the target firm anticipates subsequent bids from rival bidders and receive a 
higher premium after the initial tender offer bid, they are more likely to reject the 
initial tender offers. In this way, the shareholders of the targets, which have been 
acquired subsequently after the initial unsuccessful bid, will retain high abnormal 
returns even if they rejected the first bid because the second successful tender 
offer provided a higher premium. We sort all of the unsuccessful targets into two 
groups. In the first group, the unsuccessful targets were acquired 100% within 1 
year; while in the second group, the unsuccessful targets were not acquired within 
1 year. In our results, the targets in both samples gained significant positive 
abnormal returns, but the abnormal returns in two groups are visibly different. In 
Table 2 and Figure 3, the BHAR of unsuccessful targets, which were acquired 
within 1 year, are clearly higher than the BHAR of the targets that were not 
acquired within 1 year. For group 1, the BHAR is 45.92% in (0, +1), while for 
group 2, the BHAR is only 27.06%, which is significantly lower than that in 
group 1. For the period (0, +6), shareholders of targets which were acquired 
within 1 year gained 40.89% of abnormal returns, which is significantly more 
than 22.31% of abnormal returns that were realized by shareholders of targets not 
acquired within 1 year. In Column 5, the differences stop being significant from 
month 7 because only 23 firms left in month 7 from Column 2 Table 1. These 
results differ from those reported by BDK.  For the sample that were not acquired 
within 1 year, the abnormal returns did not return to the pre-announcement level 
within 11 months. The evidence suggests that synergy and information are 
important and the bid reveals useful information about the target’s value. BDK do 
not find evidence for the information hypothesis.  
We next use two other methods to match the firm that is most similar to the 
unsuccessful target. First, we choose the firm that is in the same industry as the 
target and has the closest book-to-market value one year before the announcement 
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year of the unsuccessful tender offer.  Secondly, the matching firm is chosen from 
the firms that are in the same industry as the unsuccessful target, closest firm size 
and book-to-market ratio. In the same industry, the 10 firms that have closest 
market value to the unsuccessful target are chosen first. Then among these 10 
firms, we choose the firm that had closest book-to-market value to the 
unsuccessful target as the matching firm. After the matching firm is found for 
each unsuccessful target, we use buy-and-hold methodology to calculate the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns in our sample. The results are demonstrated in Figure 4 
and Figure 5, separately.  
(Insert Figure 4 here) 
(Insert Figure 5 here) 
In Figure 4 and 5, the trends are similar for each sample of the unsuccessful 
targets to the trends observed in Figure 3. The shareholders of the unsuccessful 
targets gained positive abnormal returns after the announcement month of the 
tender offers for 8 months. For the sample of total unsuccessful targets, the buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) increases from the announcement month of the 
tender offers to the first month after announcement (0, +1), while decreases 
continuously for the subsequent months. Also, the BHAR of the sample “acquired 
within 1 year” is quite clearly higher than that of the sample “not acquired within 
1 year”.  The targets of both samples realized stock price run-up in the period of 
announcement month and 8 months following. The results are robust to the choice 
of the benchmark firm under different matching criteria. 
The evidence reported thus far is consistent with both the synergy and information 
hypothesis. Although the BHARs decline for the not acquired group, they do not 
drop to the pre-announcement levels. We note, however, that the evidence is not 
directly comparable with BDK so far as we have restricted the subsequent success 
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or failure to within 1 year of the failed initial bid. BDK examine the success or 
failure over a 5-year period. We do this next. 
 
6.2 Unsuccessful targets acquired within 5 years  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Table 3 represents the number of unsuccessful targets in total sample, 
“subsequently acquired within 5 years” and “not acquired within 5 years” 
subsamples in each month after announcement of unsuccessful tender offers. The 
unsuccessful targets are also investigated through two subsamples: the sample of 
“Subsequently acquired within 5 years” and the sample “Not acquired within 5 
years”. The number of firms in each event month are shown in columns 2, 3 and 4 
for each sample of failed targets. Because the subsequently successful 
acquisitions following the first unsuccessful tender offers are for complete 
acquisitions, the number of the firms in the sample “acquired within 5 years” 
decreased sharply from 145 in the announcement month to 2 in the 48 month, 
which is shown in column 4 of Table 3. The numbers of targets that are not 
acquired within 5 years dropped because some firms’ information cannot be 
found in CRSP for the 5 years after the initial unsuccessful tender offer.  
From column 2 in Table 3, the percent of firms that are acquired within 1 year is 
76.55% [(145-34)/145], while in BDK study, notably, the number is 68.6% [(86-
27)/86]. This shows that the unsuccessful targets of the tender offers are acquired 
faster in our sample period. One possible explanation could be a more robust and 
active M&A market in the more recent time period.  
The percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns to the unsuccessful targets in total 
sample, “acquired within 5 years” and “not acquired within 5 years” subsamples 
are shown in Table 4. In this part of our study, the market value (size) method is 
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used to locate the firms that match the unsuccessful targets. The matching firms 
that have the most similar market value 3 months before the announcement month 
are chosen as the benchmark to calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Figure 6 shows the trend of BHAR from the announcement month of the tender 
offers through 60 months following the announcement month in Table 4.  
(Insert Figure 6 here) 
From Table 4 and Figure 6, the patterns are different in these findings than the 
findings of the BDK analysis. In Figure 6, the BHAR in the sample of total 
unsuccessful targets increases from the announcement month of the initial 
unsuccessful tender offers to the first month. Then it decreases consistently until 
the end of the second year (24 months). As reported in Table 4, the BHAR of total 
targets in column 2 increases from 33.72% (event month 0) to 35.53% (0 to +1) 
and then decreases to 15.17% (0, +60). However, in the BDK study, the CAR 
performs steadily after it runs up from the announcement month to 5 years after. 
Further, the CAR of the firms that are taken over within 5 years, per BDK, “show 
a further positive revaluation over the one-year period”, while the BHAR in the 
same sample in our analysis runs up at the announcement month, and goes down 
consistently in the next few years. We only pay attention to the pattern until the 
end of the second year because most of the firms are acquired within 2 years and 
there are only 14 firms that were acquired after 24 months (Column 4 Table 3). It 
is seen in Table 4 that BHAR of the sample “acquired within 5 years” increases 
from 35.57% (0, 0) to 40.07% (0, +1) and decreases to 2.81% (0, +24), which 
shows no evidence for synergy. Further, the BDK study finds that the 
shareholders of the targets that are not acquired within 5 years gain positive 
abnormal returns with the announcement of the tender offers, but the gains are 
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completely wiped out two years after the announcement. In contrast, in this 
study’s findings, the BHARs in the sample “not acquired within 5 years” does 
decrease in the first 2 years after the announcement of unsuccessful tender offers, 
but they increase again in the next 3 years. These results support the information 
hypothesis, which posits that the run-up of the stock price for the targets occurs 
because of revaluation of the “undervalued” firms. Hence it should not decrease 
even if the tender offers are unsuccessful. Additionally, Column 5 shows that the 
differences of BHAR in “subsequently acquired within 5 years” sample and 
“acquired within 5 years” sample are significant for the first 3 months following 
the announcement month of tender offers.  
(Insert Figure 7 here) 
(Insert Figure 8 here) 
Similar to the analysis in the “acquired within 1 year”, we also use the book-to-
market value and B/M & market value to match the benchmark firms to the 
unsuccessful targets. The results are plotted in Figures 7 and 8, respectively. 
These two figures show similar patterns for three samples of unsuccessful targets 
separately, which suggests that the findings are robust to the benchmark choice. 
 
6.3 Targets acquired within 1 year versus targets acquired within 5 years but 
after 1 year 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
In order to verify the market assessment of the forthcoming higher premium 
tender offer, we further divided the sample into three groups: “targets acquired 
within 1 year”, “targets acquired after 1 year but within 5 years”, and “targets not 
acquired within 5 years”. The results of BHAR for each sample are reported in 
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Table 5. The BHAR in the sample of targets that are acquired within 1 year starts 
from 37.86% in the announcement month, and goes up to 45.92% in the first 
month after announcement. Meanwhile, in the sample of the “acquired within 5 
years but after 1 year”, the BHAR is 28.63% in month (0, 0) and 22.84% in month 
(0, +1). From column 5 we see that the difference (23.08%) of BHAR between 
these two subsamples is significant on 1% level in month 1 following the 
announcement month. The “within 1 year” BHAR is almost always twice as much 
as the “within 5 after 1 year” BHAR until month 8 (25.94% vs.11.89%) up to 
announcement month. Furthermore, column 5 shows that the differences are large 
and significant on 5% level. Additionally, the BHAR of “not acquired within 5 
years” sample shows no enormous difference with the BHAR of “acquired within 
5 years but after 1 year” sample. 
These results indicate that the firms that are acquired within 1 year are more 
certain about the forthcoming high-valued tender offer when they rejected the 
initial one. For the firms that are acquired within 5 years but after 1 year, the 
certainty of receiving a higher premium tender offer is much less than firms that 
are acquired within 1 year. This provides strong evidence that the market has an 
unbiased prediction for future higher-valued acquisition after the initial 
unsuccessful ones. 
 
6.4 Analysis of the returns to unsuccessful acquirers 
In this section, we investigate the firms that made unsuccessful tender offers to 
distinguish between the synergy or information hypotheses. In the related BDK 
study, the unsuccessful acquirers are divided into two basic samples. The first 
sample includes the acquiring firms that lost to the competing acquirers, which 
means the control of the targets has been changed to the rival bidders; the second 
sample includes the acquiring firms that lost to the managers of targets, which 
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means the control of the targets has not been changed. In this study, the rival 
bidding firms are defined as the firms that made successful acquisitions in which 
either the effective date or announcement time is within the tender offer period. 
The tender offer period here is defined as the period that starts from the 
announcement date of the tender offer to 3 weeks after the expiration of the tender 
offer by the unsuccessful acquiring firms.  
The methodology used here is of the short-horizon event study because we are 
interested in the short term return of the unsuccessful acquirers. The time frame 
used is daily instead of monthly for the acquirers. Event day 0 is the 
announcement day, and we investigate the returns for the acquirers 20 days before 
the announcement date to 180 days after.  
Table 6 presents the abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) gained by the shareholders of the 139 firms that made unsuccessful 
control-oriented tender offers between 1985 and 2010.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
In Table 6, the AR and CAR of all the unsuccessful bidders are shown in columns 
3 and 4 respectively. Columns 6 and 7 show the AR and CAR for the acquiring 
firms which lost to managers of targets, while columns 9 and 10 show the AR and 
CAR for the acquiring firms that lost to rival bidders, respectively. 
The CAR of the unsuccessful acquirers over time is plotted in Figure 9, and the 
summary for each event window is presented in Table 7.  
(Insert Table 7 here) 
(Insert Figure 9 here) 
Figure 9 demonstrates that the unsuccessful acquiring firms gained significant 
positive abnormal returns from 4 days before the announcement day to 9 days 
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after. In Table 6, the CAR starts to be positive at 0.26% in (-20,-4) and it goes up 
to 1.18% in the first day after announcement day (-20, 1), after which it starts to 
disappear. At day 10 after the announcement day, the CAR is -0.4%, where the 
CAR is close to 0 and after that, the CAR continues to decrease in the next 170 
days. 
After dividing into two samples, 63 firms are in the “change in control” sample, 
since they lost their bids to the rival bidders, and 76 left are in the “no change in 
control” sample, which means these acquiring firms lost the bid to the 
management of the targets. For the unsuccessful acquiring firms in the sample “no 
change in control”, the CAR is 0.12% up to 10 days after announcement while it 
is -1.11% for the firms that are in the “change in control” sample.  
From day 30 after the day 0, the CAR for the firms in the “no change in control” 
sample is -3.59%, which is more negative than the CAR (-2.72%) for the firms in 
the “change in control” sample. Following that, the CAR of the “no change in 
control” sample becomes more greatly less than the CAR of “change in control” 
sample. At the end of the event day (-20,180), the CAR is -18.46% and -6.62% 
for the sample “no change in control” and “change in control” respectively, and 
none of their stock price returns back to their pre-announcement level before the 
tender offers.  
These findings differ again from the findings of BDK study. In the BDK study, 
the CAR of the firms that lost to the management of the targets goes down to 0 
after the run-up around the announcement date and the CAR of the firms that lost 
to the rival bidders is more negative. BDK interpret their results for the “change 
in control” sample as the lost synergy benefits for the unsuccessful acquirer. Our 
results reveal that synergy is one of the motives of tender offers since the positive 
revaluation of unsuccessful acquirers disappears quickly as it appears that the bid 
will fail and the stock price in both samples does not come back to pre-
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announcement level. While synergy is not dominant motive of tender offers, since 
if synergy hypothesis dominates, the “lost to rival bidders” acquirers should lose 
more greatly as the rival bidders gain the synergy through the acquisitions.  
 
6.5 Synergy, agency or hubris? 
The findings in this study to this point appear to support both synergy and 
information hypotheses. We next implement another methodology to examine the 
three hypotheses for tender offers. Using the approach described in Berkovitch 
and Narayanan (1993), we use target gain, acquirer gain and total gain to 
determine the rationale behind tender offers. We define the target gain, acquirer 
gain and total gain in the same fashion as in their paper. 
The acquisitions in which both the targets and acquiring firms are public are 
selected for this analysis since we need to compute the gains to acquirers and 
targets. The market values of the targets and acquirers are computed 6 days prior 
to the announcement date. The CARs in time window (-5, 5) are calculated for 
each firm using the event study approach.  
After obtained CARs and market values 6 days before the announcement date for 
all the targets and acquirers in our sample, we calculate the total gain as the sum 
of the target gain and acquirer gain. Then the target gain is regressed against the 
total gain and acquirer gain, independently, as follows: 
Target gain = α + β(Total gain) 
Target gain = α + β(Acquirer gain) 
The firms are categorized into two groups: in one group the total gain is positive, 
and in another group the total gain is negative. The regression is implemented in 
each group and the results presented in Table 8. 
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(Insert Table 8 here) 
In Table 8, the coefficients of total gain and acquirer gain are shown in column 4 
while columns 5 has the P-value from the regression. Column 2 shows the number 
of firms in each sample. 
In Panel A of Table 8, the target gain is positively related to the total gain for the 
whole sample and has coefficient of 0.46 and p-value <0.0001. From Panel B, we 
find that the target gain is negatively related to the acquirer gain. The coefficient 
of the acquirer gain is -0.16 and p-value 0.05. These results suggest that the main 
motive for the acquirer in initial bid appears to be agency related. When it comes 
to the negative total gains sample, the coefficient is even more negative (-0.27) 
and is significant at a 1%-level (p-value = 0.01). In “positive total gains” sample, 
the negative correlation is not different to zero with p-value 0.98. There is some 
evidence for synergy as a motive when we look at the subsample of positive total 
gains. So far, the results reject the hubris hypothesis, by showing the significant 
correlation between the target gains and total gains since, if hubris holds, there 
should be no correlation. Overall, the analysis in Table 8 suggests that agency is 
an important consideration in the unsuccessful bids. 
We further examine whether the successful rival bidder who wins is motivated by 
agency, hubris or synergy. If the rival bidder benefits from synergy gains, it will 
provide evidence why the returns to failed acquirers in the “change in control” 
sample are higher than the “no change in control” sample. We perform the two 
regressions on the rival bidders that made successful acquisitions. The results are 
demonstrated in Table 9:  
(Insert Table 9 here) 
In column 2 of Table 9, the size of the sample is 33 because either targets or 
acquirers in 6 acquisitions lack data on CRSP. As expected, in column 4, the 
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coefficient for total gain is 0.01, which is positive and significant on 10%-level 
with p-value 0.08. This significant positive relation between target gain and total 
gain indicates that synergy exists in these successful acquisitions. Additionally, 
the coefficient for acquirer gain is 0.01, with p-value 0.13. The positive 
coefficient (although not significant at conventional levels) further suggests that 
rival bidders stand to realize potential synergy benefits from acquiring the target.  
In summary, both synergy and information are motives for acquisitions through 
tender offers, while agency problem has become an important factor in 
unsuccessful ones. Perhaps in the BDK study, agency problem also exists but 
synergy is so strong that this minimizes the agency problem. The proportion of 
unsuccessful tender offers has decreased from 20% to 5% since the early 1980s.  
One important implication from this trend is that most tender offers motivated by 
synergy are successful. In the small proportion of unsuccessful tender offers, 
agency considerations seem to have become more important.  
This result explains the trends of stock price for unsuccessful targets and 
unsuccessful acquirers seen above. For the unsuccessful targets, the returns for 
shareholders of the firms that are acquired within 5 years decrease as the acquirers 
made the tender offer based on the agency problem which makes the tender offer 
destroy the profits of the firms involved. Also, for the unsuccessful acquirers, 
firms lost to the management of the targets further because they did not choose 
the right targets, which is consistent with the agency hypothesis. This explains 





6.6 Cross Section Regression Analysis 
After distinguishing the four motives for the tender offers in our sample, we are 
further interested in understanding the determinants of successful acquisition after 
the initial unsuccessful bid. Following Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), we utilize 
staggered board, poison pill, firm size, leverage, Tobin’s q, free cash flow, 
industry activities and price run-up before announcement of tender offers to 
measure the dominant characteristics of the next successful acquisition. 
The definition of each characteristic is shown in the methodology section and the 
statistics of each characteristic is shown in Table 10 as below.  
(Insert Table 10 here) 
Some of these characteristics may be correlated, which could potentially bias the 
coefficient estimates of the analysis. For example, staggered board and poison pill 
are both antitakeover provisions (ATPs); Tobin’s q, pre-announcement price run-
up, leverage and free cash flow are all related to the performance of firms. 
Therefore, we compute the Pearson correlation among the variables. The result of 
the Pearson correlation matrix is shown in Table 11: 
(Insert Table 11 here) 
Table 11 shows that the correlation coefficients between any two variables among 
all characteristics is less than 0.23, which is the correlation between the free cash 
flow and the firm size. Hence, we feel reassured that the variables in the next 
regression are free of associations with each other. 
We implement cross section regressions using the variables above to investigate 
which characteristic(s) of target firms influence the success of subsequently being 
taken over in following years. The dependent value (Y) in this regression is a 
dummy variable that equals to 1 when the unsuccessful targets are 100% taken 
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over within 1 or 5 years, independently, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of each 
variable in the regressions are presented in Table 12. 
(Insert Table 12 here) 
In Table 12, column 2 shows the coefficient of each independent variable when 
the subsequent acquisition happens with 1 year while Column 3 shows the 
coefficients where the targets are 100% acquired within 5 years. The number of 
observations is 143 for both regressions as the information of staggered board is 
limited on either SDC or CRSP. 
In the first regression, the probability of being acquired within 1 year for 
unsuccessful targets is positively related to the industry M&A activities and the 
stock price run-up in the period (-210 to -11) before the announcement day of the 
initial unsuccessful tender offers. For the variable industry M&A, the coefficient 
estimated is 7.23 with p-value 0.05, which means unsuccessful targets becoming 
acquired within 1 year is significantly and positively related to the M&A activities 
in the industry on a 5% significance level. This result indicates that for the targets 
operating in an industry where the M&A is more active it is more likely to receive 
a subsequent higher-valued tender offer after the initial failed offer. For the 
variable stock price run-up, the coefficient estimated is 0.60, which means that the 
stock price increases by 1 in 11 to 210 days prior to the announcement date of the 
initial tender offers, the probability of being taken over within 1 year after the 
unsuccessful tender offer increases 0.60. The P-value for this estimation is 0.07, 
which shows significance on a 10%-level. Additionally, takeover provision, such 
as poison pill and staggered board, is negatively related to unsuccessful targets 
being acquired within 1 year with coefficients -0.14 and -0.52 (respectively), 
which is expected. Coefficient 0.17 for size indicates the larger the targets, the 
more likely they are to get acquired within 1 year. The unexpected result is that 
the coefficient of Tobin’s q is negative and the coefficient of leverage is positive, 
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while the p-value of 0.34 and 0.42 shows that the results are not significant 
though. Further, unsuccessful targets with more cash flow are more likely to be 
acquired within 1 year, but the coefficient is not significant. 
For the targets that are acquired within 5 years, the picture is different from that of 
the targets that are taken over within 1 year. From column 3 we find that the 
probability of being acquired within 5 years is negatively related to the poison pill 
and positively to the firm size and industry M&A activities. The coefficient of 
poison pill is -0.71, which is significant on a 10%-level (p-value=0.07). That 
means the targets are less likely to be acquired within 5 years if the targets have 
the poison pill as antitakeover provisions (ATPs). Furthermore, when the firm 
size increases by 1, the probability of the target being taken over within 5 years 
increase by 0.5, which is significant on a 10%-level with the p-value 0.06. Similar 
to the situation in the first regression, the targets are more likely to be taken over 
within 5 years when the industry that they belong to has more M&A activities. 
Additionally, the signs of other variables are all the same as the same variables in 
the first regression, while not significant. 
In conclusion, the unsuccessful targets are easier to be acquired within 1 year, 
when the firm belongs to a more active industry with more M&A activity, or has 
more stock price run-up 11 to 210 days before announcement; meanwhile to 
predict if targets will be acquired within 5 years, poison pill, firm size and 
industry M&A are more related variables. 
 
6.7 Characteristics that influence the success of the acquirers 
After the analysis of the characteristics that influence the subsequent acquisition 
of the unsuccessful targets, we further analyze which characteristics lead the 
unsuccessful bidders to lose to rival bidders. Hence, we choose several 
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characteristics and compare them from initial unsuccessful acquiring firms to 
successful rival bidders. Those characteristics chosen are defined in the 
methodology section. 
In the total sample, the unsuccessful bidding firms that lost to rival firms counted 
63, while among 63 rival bidders, only 39 have information on CRSP or 
Bloomberg as the other firms are not public. Hence, we attempt to obtain the data 
of each characteristic of each firm both in the sample of “failed bidders” and 
“rival bidders”, and analyze the data in pairs. Those results are shown in Table 13. 
(Insert Table 13 here) 
Table 13 shows the results of comparing the characteristics between the paired 
bidders (the unsuccessful acquirers vs. the successful rival acquirers). Column 1 
shows the characteristic, columns 2 and 3 show the average of the characteristics 
in the samples for “failed bidders” and “rival bidders” respectively, with the 
variance is shown in parentheses, and columns 4 and 5 show the T-value and P-
value for each statistics analysis independently. 
From the results, we find that the failure of the initial bidders is significantly 
related to some characteristics of the firms. Firstly, the average firm size of the 
rival bidders is 3.31, which is significantly larger than the size (2.96) of the 
unsuccessful bidders on a 1%-level (P=0.01). This result indicates that the greater 
the size of the bidder firm, the greater the chance for it to win the bid. Secondly, 
the average Tobin’s q (1.92) for rivals is significantly larger than the value (1.41) 
of the failed acquirers on 5%-level (p=0.05). This suggests that the greater the 
growth opportunities of the acquirer, the greater the chance of success of the 
tender offer. Furthermore, the acquirer’s industry also plays an important role in 
the success of the tender offers. The average of 0.13 for rivals versus 0.18 for 
failed acquirers indicates that it is more likely for acquirers to achieve a 
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successful tender offer if they belong to an industry where the M&A activities are 
less active. The last finding in the results is somewhat unexpected. In the analysis 
of diversification, diversification is defined as the acquirer and the target each 
belonging to a different industry. In the results, it can be seen that the average of 
the diversification index is higher in rival bidders, at 0.67 than in unsuccessful 
bidders at 0.46 on 5% significance level (p=0.02). That signifies that if the 
acquirer is in different industry than the target for the tender offer, the more likely 
it is for it to win the acquisition. There is no significant difference between the 
two groups in terms of staggered board, leverage, cash flow, relative size and 
management quality.  
In summary, the success of the tender offers is significantly related to several 
characteristics of bidders. The results demonstrate that firm size, Tobin’s q, 
industry M&A activity and diversification of the acquiring firms are all the vital 
factors in tender offer success.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The BDK analysis examines the unsuccessful tender offers from 1963 to 1980 in 
order to determine the rationale behind tender offers. There are two hypotheses in 
their study: information and synergy. BDK conclude that acquirers make 
acquisitions through tender offers to gain the potential synergy, and target gains at 
announcement do not reveal any information about their undervaluation. The 
BDK study is fairly dated given the time frame of the tender offers utilized in 
their sample. Not only has the mergers and acquisitions market changed 
significantly since then, but also notably have finance research methodologies in 
the last thirty-five years.  In this new analysis, we re-examine the motives behind 
tender offers by investigating unsuccessful tender offers by utilizing data over a 
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more recent time period from 1985 to 2010 to distinguish information from 
synergy. The analysis uses the basic approach described in the BDK paper but 
adopts the current buy-and-hold abnormal returns methodology to investigate the 
returns to targets and acquirers of unsuccessful tender offers.  
The results of BHAR to unsuccessful targets show that targets who rejected the 
initial tender offers gain positive abnormal returns in the announcement period. 
Additionally, shareholders of targets that were acquired within twelve months 
gained more wealth than targets that were not acquired within twelve months. 
This suggests synergy is one of the motives for tender offers. However, the results 
show that over a larger time frame, the abnormal returns to shareholders of targets 
acquired within 5 years are sharply eliminated following the announcement month, 
while stock prices of targets not acquired within 5 years maintain a consistently 
high level for the following 5 years. BDK examine the eventual outcome only 
over a 5 year period. Our results differ from BDK’s finding and suggest that new 
information on the target's value is revealed when it receives a bid that 
subsequently fails.  
Furthermore, the results show that the short term CARs to unsuccessful acquirers 
initially increase around the announcement but subsequently decrease quickly 
when the likelihood of a successful bid diminishes, and the CARs do not return to 
the pre-announcement level. Overall, this appears to support the synergy 
hypothesis. However, further analysis shows that acquirers who lose to rival 
bidders have less negative CARs compared to bidders who lose to target 
management, which suggests that synergy is not quite as dominant a motive for 
tender offers, loss to rival bidders should incur greater losses to losing bidders as 
they would not benefit from the combination.   
In addition to synergy and information, two new hypotheses, agency and hubris, 
proposed since the BDK study, have been found to explain acquisition motives. 
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Following the approach in Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), in this study we 
also examine agency and hubris, along with synergy, by utilizing the correlations 
between target gain, total gain and acquirer gain. The significant positive 
correlations between target gain and total gain reject the hubris hypothesis. 
However, the target gain is negatively related to the acquirer gain. Further, we 
find that in the negative total gains subsample, the negative correlation between 
the target gain and the acquirer gain is significantly more pronounced, while in 
the positive totals gains subsample, the negative correlation becomes not 
significant from zero. Thus, we conclude that while synergy is a motive for the 
positive total gains subsample, the evidence is more consistent with the agency 
motive for unsuccessful tender offers. A further examination of the correlations 
among the successful rival’s bids shows that the target gain is positively related to 
both total gain and acquirer gain, further supporting this claim. 
The cross-sectional regressions among unsuccessful targets' characteristics show  
that greater M&A industry activity, higher price run-up before announcement for 
the target, larger firm size, and the absence of a poison pill provision increase the 
likelihood of unsuccessful targets being acquired within 5 years following the 
initial announcement. In addition, a comparison between unsuccessful bidders and 
rival bidders shows that firms with greater size, more growth opportunities, firms 
that belong to industries different from those of the targets, and firms that are in a 
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Figure 1. Percentage of the successful control-oriented M&A and failed control-oriented M&A 
out of all control-oriented M&A happened in 1985-2010 
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Figure 3. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (matching by industry & size) to the unsuccessful 
targets – total sample and “subsequently taken over within 1 year” and “not taken over within 1 
year” in the period 1985-2010. 
 
 
Figure 4. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (matching by industry & book-to-market value) to the 
unsuccessful targets – total sample and “subsequently taken over within 1 year” and “not taken 
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Figure 5. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (matching by size & industry & book-to-market value) 
to the unsuccessful targets – total sample and “subsequently taken over within 1 year” and “not 
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Figure 6. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (matching by industry & size) to the unsuccessful 
targets – total sample and “subsequently taken over within 5 years” and “not taken over within 5 
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Figure 7. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (matching by industry & book-to-market value) to the 
unsuccessful targets – total sample and “subsequently taken over within 5 years” and “not taken 
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Figure 8. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (matching by size & industry & book-to-market value) 
to the unsuccessful targets – total sample and “subsequently taken over within 5 years” and “not 
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Figure 9. Cumulative abnormal returns to unsuccessful acquirers – total sample, and “change in 
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Table 1: Number of unsuccessful targets “acquired within 1 year” and “not acquired 
within 1 year” in each month after announcement of tender offers  
Table 1 reports the number of unsuccessful targets in total sample, “subsequently acquired within 
1 year” and “not acquired within 1 year” subsamples in each month after announcement of 
unsuccessful tender offers. The total sample includes 240 unsuccessful target firms which lost 
the control-oriented tender offers between 1985 and 2010. The total sample are categorized into 
“subsequently acquired within 1 year” and “not acquired within 1 year” subsamples. In 
“subsequently acquired within 1 year” subsample, the unsuccessful target firms were acquired in 
another acquisition after the initial unsuccessful tender offers within 1 year; in “not acquired 
within 1 year” subsample, the unsuccessful target firms were not acquired successfully after the 
unsuccessful tender offers within 1 year. Event month 0 denotes announcement month. N 
denotes the number of firms in each sample in each event month. The number of firms decreases 
with time because the targets which were acquired are absorbed after the second successful 
acquisition since we concentrate on the 100% acquisitions for the subsequently successful deals. 
Event month Total sample Subsequently acquired 
within 1 year 
Not acquired within 1 
year 
N N N 
0 240 109 131 
+1 236 106 130 
+2 216 87 129 
+3 202 74 128 
+4 184 57 127 
+5 174 48 126 
+6 160 35 125 
+7 147 23 124 
+8 138 15 123 
+9 129 7 122 
+10 126 5 121 












Table 2: Percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns to the unsuccessful targets “acquired 
within 1 year” and “not acquired within 1 year” in time windows 
Table 2 represents the percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to the unsuccessful 
targets in time windows in total sample, “subsequently acquired within 1 year” and “not acquired 
within 1 year” subsamples. BHARi(t,T)=∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1   - ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1  is used to 
calculate BHAR. The firm, which is not only in the same industry with the unsuccessful target 
but also has closest market value to the unsuccessful target’s 3 months before announcement of 
the tender offers, is selected as the benchmark for each unsuccessful target. Only 11 months 
following the announcement date are presented in this table because the unsuccessful targets 
which were acquired within 1 year are total absorbed up to 12 months after announcement. 
Column 5 is the comparison of the BHAR to the unsuccessful targets in both subsamples. T-
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year (1) 
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Table 3: Number of unsuccessful targets “acquired within 5 years” and “not acquired 
within 5 years” in each month after announcement of tender offers 
Table 3 reports the number of unsuccessful targets in total sample, “subsequently acquired within 
5 years” and “not acquired within 5 years” subsamples in each month after announcement of 
unsuccessful tender offers. The total sample includes 240 unsuccessful target firms which lost 
the tender offers between 1985 and 2010. The total sample are categorized into “subsequently 
acquired within 5 years” and “not acquired within 5 years” subsamples. In “subsequently 
acquired within 5 years” subsample, the unsuccessful target firms were acquired in another 
acquisition after the initial unsuccessful tender offers within 5 years; in “not acquired within 5 
years” subsample, the unsuccessful target firms were not acquired successfully after the 
unsuccessful tender offers within 5 years. Event month 0 denotes announcement month. N 
denotes the number of firms in each sample in each event month. The number of firms decreases 
with time because the targets which were acquired are absorbed after the second successful 
acquisition since we concentrate on the 100% acquisitions for the subsequently successful deals. 
Event month Total sample Subsequently acquired 
within 5 years 
Not acquired within 5 
years 
N N N 
0 240 145 95 
+1 236 142 94 
+2 216 123 93 
+3 202 110 92 
+6 160 71 89 
+12 119 34 85 
+24 94 14 80 
+48 68 2 66 













Table 4: Percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns to the unsuccessful targets “acquired 
within 5 years” and “not acquired within 5 years” in time windows 
Table 4 represents the percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to the unsuccessful 
targets in time windows in total sample, “subsequently acquired within 5 years” and “not 
acquired within 5 years” subsamples. BHARi(t,T)=∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1   - ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1  is 
used to calculate BHAR. The firm, which is not only in the same industry with the unsuccessful 
target but also has closest market value to the unsuccessful target’s 3 months before 
announcement of the tender offers, is selected as the benchmark for each unsuccessful target. 
Column 5 is the comparison of the BHAR to the unsuccessful targets in both subsamples. T-
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Table 5: Percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns to the unsuccessful targets “acquired 
within 1 year”, “acquired within 5 years but after 1 year” and “not acquired within 5 years” 
Table 5 represents the percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to the unsuccessful 
targets in time windows in “subsequently acquired within 1 year”, “subsequently acquired within 
5 years but after 1 year” and “not acquired within 5 years” subsamples. BHARi(t,T)=∏ (1 +𝑇𝑡=1
𝑅𝑖,𝑡)  - ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1  is used to calculate BHAR. The firm, which is not only in the 
same industry with the unsuccessful target but also has closest market value to the unsuccessful 
target’s 3 months before announcement of the tender offers, is selected as the benchmark for 
each unsuccessful target. Column 5 is the comparison of the BHAR to the unsuccessful targets in 
“subsequently acquired within 1 year” and “subsequently acquired within 5 years but after 1 
year”. T-statistics is shown in parentheses. 
Event time period 
(in months) 
Subsequently 
acquired within 1 
year (1) 
Subsequently 
acquired within 5 
years but after 1 
year (2) 
Not subsequently 
acquired within 5 
years (3) 
(1) – (2) 
0 to 0 37.86%*** 
(11.68) 















































































Table 6: ARs and CARs to unsuccessful “no change in control” acquirers and “change in 
control” acquirers in each day after announcement of tender offers 
Table 6 represents the percentage abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
to the unsuccessful acquirers each event day in total sample, “no change in control” and “change 







𝑖=1  is adopted to measure CAR. Event day 0 denotes announcement day of tender offers. 
The total sample includes 139 unsuccessful acquiring firms which lost the tender offers between 
1985 and 2010. The total sample are categorized into “no change in control” and “change in 
control” subsamples. In “no change in control” subsample, the unsuccessful acquirers lost the bid 
to management of the targets, hence the control of the targets was not changed; in “change in 
control” subsample, the unsuccessful acquirers lost to rival bidders, thus the control of the targets 




Total sample  No change in control  Change in control  
N AR CAR N AR CAR N AR CAR 
-20 139 -0.02% -0.02% 76 0.04% 0.04% 63 -0.10% -0.10% 
-15 139 0.04% 0.17% 76 0.10% 0.42% 63 -0.04% -0.16% 
-10 139 -0.32% -0.27% 76 -0.67% -0.05% 63 0.09% -0.58% 
-5 139 0.07% -0.02% 76 -0.10% -0.29% 63 0.27% 0.25% 
-4 139 0.28% 0.26% 76 0.59% 0.30% 63 -0.09% 0.16% 
-3 139 0.15% 0.41% 76 0.07% 0.37% 63 0.23% 0.39% 
-2 139 0.49% 0.90% 76 0.58% 0.95% 63 0.38% 0.77% 
-1 139 0.27% 1.17% 76 0.66% 1.61% 63 -0.19% 0.58% 
0 139 -0.39%** 0.78% 76 -0.43%** 1.18% 63 -0.34% 0.24% 
1 139 0.40% 1.18% 76 0.61%* 1.79% 63 0.14% 0.38% 
2 139 -0.15% 1.03% 76 -0.38% 1.41% 63 0.12% 0.50% 
3 139 -0.48% 0.55% 76 -0.39% 1.02% 63 -0.59%* -0.09% 
4 139 -0.23% 0.32% 76 -0.51% 0.51% 63 0.10% 0.01% 
5 139 0.16% 0.48% 76 0.32% 0.83% 63 -0.04% -0.03% 
10 138 -0.54% -0.40% 75 -0.91% 0.12% 63 -0.11% -1.11% 
15 138 -0.96%* -1.51% 75 -1.03% -1.66% 63 -0.87% -1.42% 
20 138 0.01% -2.02% 75 0.07% -1.79% 63 -0.05% -2.37% 
30 138 -0.47% -3.15% 75 -0.46%* -3.59% 63 -0.48% -2.72% 
40 138 -0.05% -3.83%*** 75 0.18% -4.07% 63 -0.33% -3.66% 
80 138 -0.14%* -8.16%*** 75 -0.23% -12.00%*** 63 -0.03% -3.64% 
100 138 -0.29% -10.09%*** 75 -0.14% -14.89%*** 63 -0.47% -4.54% 
120 138 0.73% -11.30%*** 75 1.05%** -15.99%*** 63 0.33% -5.86% 
140 138 -0.44% -12.43%*** 75 -0.50% -17.03%*** 63 -0.37% -7.09%* 
160 138 0.13%** -12.49%** 75 0.13%** -17.67%*** 63 0.12% -6.49% 
180 137 0.32% -12.97%** 74 0.29% -18.46%*** 63 0.36% -6.62% 




Table 7: CARs to “no change in control” acquirers and “change in control” acquirers in 
time windows 
Table 7 represents the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to the unsuccessful acquirers each 
event day in total sample, “no change in control” and “change in control” subsamples. ARit= Rit 




𝑡=𝑡0  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  is adopted to measure CAR. 
Event day 0 denotes announcement day of tender offers. Event time period is measured from 20 
days before the announcement of the tender offers to 180 days after the tender offers. The total 
sample are categorized into “no change in control” and “change in control” subsamples. In “no 
change in control” subsample, the unsuccessful acquirers lost the bid to management of the 
targets, hence the control of the targets was not changed; in “change in control” subsample, the 
unsuccessful acquirers lost to rival bidders, thus the control of the targets was transferred to rival 
bidders. T-statistics is shown in parentheses. 




No change in control 
 
Change in control 
 

















































Table 8: Analysis about motives of tender offers 
Table 8 repots the results of analysis about motives of tender offers. Panel A represents the result 
of regression about the relationship between target gain and total gain; panel B represents the 
result of regression about the relationship between target gain and acquirer gain. The total 
sample includes 123 unsuccessful tender offers, in which both the targets and acquirers are 
public firms, having available data in SDC between 1985 and 2010. The total sample are 
categorized into “negative total gains” and “positive total gains” subsamples. Target gain is 
calculated by multiplying the target’s CAR (-5,5) by the market value of the target firm’s equity 
6 days prior to the announcement of the tender offer, minus the value of the target shared held by 
the acquirer; Acquirer gain is calculated by multiplying the acquirer’s CAR (-5,5) by the market 
value of the acquirer firm’s equity 6 days prior to the announcement of the tender offer; total 
gain is the sum of target gain and acquirer gain. 
Sample Size Intercept Coefficient P-value Adjusted R2 
Panel A. Target gain = 𝛼 + 𝛽(Total gain)   
Total sample 123 31.56 0.46*** <.0001 0.36 
Negative total 
gain 
65 -86.37 0.37*** <.0001 0.21 
Positive total 
gain  
58 33.99 0.71*** <.0001 0.70 
Panel B. Target gain = 𝛼 + 𝛽(Acquirer gain)   
Total sample 123 -85.67 -0.16** 0.05 0.02 
Negative total 
gain 
65 -398.75 -0.27*** 0.01 0.09 
Positive total 
gain  
58 221.91 -0.005 0.98 -0.02 












Table 9: Robustness test about the motives of tender offers 
Table 9 repots the results of robustness test about motives of tender offers. Panel A represents 
the result of regression among successful rival bidders about the relationship between target gain 
and total gain; panel B represents the result of regression about the relationship between target 
gain and acquirer gain. The total sample includes 33 successful acquisitions, which are made by 
the rival bidders. Target gain is calculated by multiplying the target’s CAR (-5,5) by the market 
value of the target firm’s equity 6 days prior to the announcement of the tender offer, minus the 
value of the target shared held by the acquirer; Acquirer gain is calculated by multiplying the 
acquirer’s CAR (-5,5) by the market value of the acquirer firm’s equity 6 days prior to the 
announcement of the tender offer; total gain is the sum of target gain and acquirer gain. 
Sample Size Intercept Coefficient P-value Adjusted R2 
Panel A. Target gain = 𝜶 + 𝜷(Total gain)   
 33 1.78 0.01* 0.08 0.07 
Panel B. Target gain = 𝜶 + 𝜷(Acquirer gain)   
 33 1.68 0.01 0.13 0.04 



















Table 10: Summary Statistics 
Table 10 repots the summary statistics of variables about the targets in unsuccessful tender offers 
between 1985 and 2010. Staggered board equals to 1 when the board of target firm is classified, 
0 otherwise. Poison pill equals to 1 when the firm has poison pill as antitakeover provision, 0 
otherwise. Market value of asset ($mil) is measured by book value of assets minus book value of 
common equity plus market value of common equity. Tobin’s q is calculated by market value of 
assets divided by book value of assets. Free cash flow is measured as: (Operating income before 
depreciation – interest expenses-income taxes-capital expenditures) / book value of total assets. 
Leverage is calculated by book value of (long term debts + short term debts) divided by market 
value of total assets; Stock price runup is defined as the target’s buy-and-hold abnormal return 
during the period (-210,-11). Industry M&A is defined as the deal value of all M&A deals in the 
initial unsuccessful target’s industry and year scaled by total book value of assets of all 
COMPUSTAT firms in the same industry in the same year. 
 Mean Median St Dev 
Staggered board 0.32 0 0.47 
Poison pill 0.35 0 0.48 
Total assets($mil) 1294.05 265.63 3263.48 
Market value of equity($mil) 681.37 170.43 1264.07 
Tobin’s q 1.37 1.24 1.04 
Free cash flow 0.01 0.03 0.13 
Leverage 0.20 0.17 0.23 
Stock price runup -0.08 -0.07 0.62 













Table 11: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Table 11 repots the result of Pearson correlation matrix about the variables of the targets in 
unsuccessful tender offers between 1985 and 2010. SB denotes staggered board, which equals to 
1 when the board of target firm is classified, 0 otherwise. Pp denotes poison pill, which equals to 
1 when the firm has poison pill as antitakeover provision, 0 otherwise. Size is calculated by log 
of book value of target’s total assets ($mil). LEVR denotes leverage which is calculated by book 
value of (long term debts + short term debts) divided by market value of total assets. Market 
value of total asset is measured by book value of assets minus book value of common equity plus 
market value of common equity. Q denotes Tobin’s q which is calculated by market value of 
assets divided by book value of assets. FCF denotes free cash flow which is measured as: 
(Operating income before depreciation – interest expenses-income taxes-capital expenditures) / 
book value of total assets. IND denotes industry M&A which is defined as the deal value of all 
M&A deals in the initial unsuccessful target’s industry and year scaled by total book value of 
assets of all COMPUSTAT firms in the same industry in the same year. PUP denotes stock price 
runup which is defined as the target’s buy-and-hold abnormal return during the period (-210,-11). 
Market value of asset ($mil) is measured by book value of assets minus book value of common 
equity plus market value of common equity. 
 SB Pp Size LEVR Q FCF IND PUP 
SB 1 
 














































































































Table 12: Estimated coefficients of variables for unsuccessful targets 
Table 12 repots the coefficient of the variables of the targets in unsuccessful tender offers 
between 1985 and 2010. Staggered board, Poison pill, Size, Tobin’s q, Leverage, Free cash flow, 
Industry M&A, Stock price runup are defined in Table 11. The number of observations included 
in the cross section regression analysis is 143 since information of staggered board is limited on 
either SDC or CRSP. The independent variable equals to 1 when the target was 100% acquired 
within 1 year or 5 years, separately, after the announcement of the initial unsuccessful bid; 0 
otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses 
 Acquired within 1 Year Acquired within 5 Years 




































Number of obs. 143 143 
Wald 10.18 14.30 












Table 13: Comparison of characteristics between failed bidders and rival bidders 
Table 13 repots the comparison of the means of variables between the unsuccessful bidders and 
the successful rival bidders between 1985 and 2010. Staggered board, Size, Tobin’s q, Leverage, 
Free cash flow, Industry M&A and Stock price runup are defined in Table 11. Diversification 
equals to 1 if the bidder and the target do not share a Fama-French 12 industry and 0 otherwise. 
Relative size is defined as deal value over bidder market value of equity. Management quality is 
measured by the operating income growth rate, which is defined as (EBITDAt-1 – EBITDAt-
4)/EBITDAt-4, adjusted for the industry median. The number of observation is 63 for failed 
bidders and 39 for rival bidders, which is because 24 rival bidders are private firms, lacing data 





T Stat P(T<=t)  
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Table 14: BHAR to unsuccessful targets – Matching firms with SIZE&INDUSTRY 
Table 14 represents the WHOLE table of percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to 
the unsuccessful targets in time windows in total sample, “subsequently acquired within 5 years” 
and “not acquired within 5 years” subsamples. BHARi(t,T)= ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1   - ∏ (1 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡) is used to calculate BHAR. The firm, which is not only in the same industry with 
the unsuccessful target but also has closest market value to the unsuccessful target’s 3 months 
before announcement of the tender offers, is selected as the benchmark for each unsuccessful 
target. Column 5 is the comparison of the BHAR to the unsuccessful targets in both subsamples. 
T-statistics is shown in parentheses. 
Event time 
period 
Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired  
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
(in months) 
0 to 0 33.72%*** 35.57%*** 30.89%*** 4.68% 
(15.15) (12.61) (8.54) (1.03) 
0 to +1 35.53%*** 40.07%*** 28.67%*** 11.4%** 
(14.73) (12.32) (8.34) (2.34) 
0 to +2 33.00%*** 37.99%*** 26.39%*** 11.6%** 
(13.32) (11.41) (7.31) (2.34) 
0 to +3 28.57%*** 33.25%*** 22.97%*** 10.28%** 
(10.93) (9.94) (5.65) (1.97) 
0 to +4 27.46%*** 30.21%*** 24.66%*** 5.55% 
(9.34) (7.22) (5.96) (0.94) 
0 to +5 25.67%*** 30.17%*** 21.47%*** 8.70% 
(7.77) (6.91) (4.38) (1.32) 
0 to +6 26.38%*** 29.61%*** 23.8%*** 5.81% 
(6.91) (5.67) (4.35) (0.75) 
0 to +7 22.17%*** 23.40%*** 21.34%*** 2.06% 
(5.45) (3.76) (3.96) (0.25) 
0 to +8 17.87%*** 16.02%** 18.96%*** -2.94% 
(4.03) (2.15) (3.42) (-0.32) 
0 to +9 18.57%*** 16.91%** 19.41%*** -2.50% 
(3.72) (1.89) (3.21) (-0.24) 
0 to +10 16.07%*** 15.80%** 16.21%*** -0.41% 
(3.35) (1.89) (2.75) (-0.04) 
0 to +11 15.05%*** 17.60%** 13.97%** 3.63% 
(2.98) (1.93) (2.29) (0.33) 
0 to +12 16.95%*** 21.29%** 15.22%** 6.07% 
(3.07) (2.33) (2.22) (0.49) 
0 to +13 16.69%*** 17.90% 16.26%** 1.64% 
(2.73) (1.60) (2.22) (0.12) 
0 to +14 13.29%* 11.31% 13.88%* -2.57% 
(2.10) (0.94) (1.86) (-0.17) 
0 to +15 10.09% 5.52% 11.42% -5.90% 
(1.43) (0.40) (1.40) (-0.35) 
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Table 14 -  Continued 
Event time 
period 
Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired  
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
0 to +16 11.13% 8.90% 11.77% -2.87% 
(1.46) (0.57) (1.34) (-0.16) 
0 to +17 13.05% 15.23% 12.45% 2.78% 
(1.64) (0.88) (1.38) (0.14) 
0 to +18 6.79% -7.11% 9.71% -16.82% 
(0.79) (-0.38) (1.00) (-0.74) 
0 to +19 7.06% -0.85% 8.64% -9.50% 
(0.81) (-0.04) (0.89) (-0.40) 
0 to +20 5.47% -6.44% 7.70% -14.14% 
(0.62) (-0.32) (0.78) (-0.58) 
0 to +21 5.15% -8.45% 7.70% -16.15% 
(0.56) (-0.47) (0.74) (-0.64) 
0 to +22 3.26% -2.52% 4.35% -6.87% 
(0.35) (-0.12) (0.42) (-0.27) 
0 to +23 5.90% -7.66% 8.28% -15.94% 
(0.61) (-0.33) (0.78) (-0.58) 
0 to +24 8.09% 2.82% 9.01% -6.19% 
(0.82) (0.12) (0.83) (-0.22) 
0 to +25 8.53% -0.91% 10.07% -10.97% 
(0.81) (-0.03) (0.88) (-0.36) 
0 to +26 9.21% 2.12% 10.19% -8.07% 
(0.84) (0.07) (0.87) (-0.24) 
0 to +27 10.41% 6.37% 10.97% -4.60% 
(0.95) (0.21) (0.92) (-0.14) 
0 to +28 5.78% 2.82% 6.19% -3.36% 
(0.51) (0.09) (0.50) (-0.10) 
0 to +29 3.92% -5.92% 5.18% -11.10% 
(0.35) (-0.15) (0.44) (-0.31) 
0 to +30 6.06% -4.15% 7.36% -11.52% 
(0.53) (-0.11) (0.61) (-0.32) 
0 to +31 7.09% -2.97% 8.41% -11.38% 
(0.62) (-0.09) (0.69) (-0.32) 
0 to +32 6.86% -6.00% 8.22% -14.22% 
(0.61) (-0.18) (0.69) (-0.37) 
0 to +33 10.47% 4.36% 11.13% -6.76% 
(0.91) (0.11) (0.92) (-0.17) 
0 to +34 8.55% -39.02% 13.62% -52.64% 
(0.77) (-1.44) (1.16) (-1.42) 
0 to +35 7.59% -41.58% 12.83% -54.41% 
(0.66) (-1.58) (1.04) (-1.40) 
0 to +36 8.61% -33.04% 12.50% -45.54% 
(0.72) (-1.16) (0.99) (-1.07) 
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Table 14 -  Continued 
Event time 
period 
Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired  
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
0 to +37 8.67% -41.52% 12.69% -54.21% 
(0.72) (-1.32) (1.00) (-1.19) 
0 to +38 10.90% -47.23% 14.83% -62.05% 
(0.88) (-1.27) (1.14) (-1.22) 
0 to +39 13.97% -50.42% 18.32% -68.75% 
(1.12) (-1.41) (1.41) (-1.35) 
0 to +40 17.64% -45.31% 21.90% -67.21% 
(1.39) (-1.60) (1.64) (-1.29) 
0 to +41 14.86% -66.29% 20.34% -86.64% 
(1.13) (-1.67) (1.50) (-1.62) 
0 to +42 13.80% -47.25% 17.10% -64.35% 
(1.03) (-0.99) (1.24) (-1.06) 
0 to +43 14.85% -49.06% 18.35% -67.41% 
(1.18) (-1.00) (1.42) (-1.20) 
0 to +44 15.99% -60.06% 20.22% -80.27% 
(1.22) (-1.10) (1.51) (-1.38) 
0 to +45 15.41% -62.35% 19.86% -82.20% 
(1.19) (-1.09) (1.51) (-1.45) 
0 to +46 15.43% -57.55% 19.61% -77.16% 
(1.18) (-0.99) (1.47) (-1.34) 
0 to +47 17.58% -78.03% 21.80% -99.83% 
(1.26) (-1.02) (1.55) (-1.45) 
0 to +48 17.49% -2.81% 18.11% -20.92% 
(1.21) (-0.04) (1.22) (-0.24) 
0 to +49 19.31% 9.39% 19.61% -10.22% 
(1.31) (0.14) (1.30) (-0.12) 
0 to +50 23.70% -1.97% 24.49% -26.47% 
(1.55) (-0.03) (1.55) (-0.29) 
0 to +51 22.65% -2.83% 23.44% -26.28% 
(1.50) (-0.05) (1.51) (-0.30) 
0 to +52 24.44% -7.93% 25.45% -33.38% 
(1.59) (-0.18) (1.61) (-0.37) 
0 to +53 26.45% -3.26% 27.38%* -30.64% 
(1.67) (-0.06) (1.68) (-0.33) 
0 to +54 30.10% -58.31% 31.48%* -89.78% 
(1.93)  (1.99) (-0.70) 
0 to +55 21.85% -63.42% 23.20% -86.62% 
(1.46)  (1.53) (-0.71) 
0 to +56 21.42% -61.17% 22.73% -83.91% 
(1.36)  (1.43) (-0.66) 
0 to +57 21.55% -65.16% 22.97% -88.12% 
(1.38)  (1.45) (-0.71) 
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Table 14 - Continued 
Event time 
period 
Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired  
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
0 to +58 19.89% -66.76% 21.31% -88.07% 
(1.23)  (1.30) (-0.68) 
0 to +59 21.21% -68.06% 22.70% -90.76% 
(1.34)  (1.42) (-0.73) 



























Table 15: BHAR to unsuccessful targets – Matching firms with B/M&INDUSTRY 
Table 15 represents the WHOLE table of percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to 
the unsuccessful targets in time windows in total sample, “subsequently acquired within 5 years” 
and “not acquired within 5 years” subsamples. BHARi(t,T)= ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1   - ∏ (1 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡) is used to calculate BHAR. The firm, which is not only in the same industry with 
the unsuccessful target but also has closest book-to market value to the unsuccessful target’s 1 
year before announcement of the tender offers, is selected as the benchmark for each 
unsuccessful target. Column 5 is the comparison of the BHAR to the unsuccessful targets in both 




Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired 
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
0 to 0 32.62%*** 34.26%*** 30.07%*** 4.19% 
(14.78) (12.22) (8.41) (0.93) 
0 to +1 33.65%*** 37.49%*** 27.76%*** 9.74%* 
(12.51) (10.13) (7.46) (1.78) 
0 to +2 30.16%*** 35.42%*** 23.22%*** 12.20%** 
(10.86) (9.17) (6.05) (2.20) 
0 to +3 24.08%*** 28.47%*** 18.86%*** 9.61% 
(8.08) (6.59) (4.74) (1.61) 
0 to +4 22.13%*** 22.98%*** 21.26%*** 1.72% 
(6.80) (4.43) (5.45) (0.26) 
0 to +5 19.78%*** 16.02%*** 23.11%*** -7.09% 
(5.34) (2.85) (4.72) (-0.96) 
0 to +6 18.40%*** 12.31%* 23.23%*** -10.92% 
(4.27) (1.77) (4.31) (-1.26) 
0 to +7 16.90%*** 10.70% 21.08%*** -10.38% 
(3.44) (1.19) (3.80) (-1.04) 
0 to +8 16.89%*** 7.80% 22.35%*** -14.55% 
(3.23) (0.81) (3.73) (-1.35) 
0 to +9 17.64%*** 10.67% 21.21%*** -10.53% 
(3.26) (1.04) (3.39) (-0.92) 
0 to +10 14.31%*** 4.51% 19.15%*** -14.64% 
(2.72) (0.49) (3.00) (-1.31) 
0 to +11 16.20%*** 8.74% 19.43%*** -10.69% 
(3.08) (0.92) (3.08) (-0.93) 
0 to +12 15.95%** 9.10% 18.75%*** -9.64% 
(2.74) (0.83) (2.73) (-0.75) 
0 to +13 14.12%** 0.94% 18.88%*** -17.94% 
(2.33) (0.08) (2.64) (-1.31) 
0 to +14 13.32% -10.18% 20.49%*** -30.67%** 
(2.02) (-0.75) (2.76) (-1.99) 
0 to +15 8.88% -16.39% 16.46%** -32.85%* 
(1.24) (-1.14) (2.02) (-1.95) 
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Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired 
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
0 to +16 9.00% -22.01% 18.02%** -40.03%** 
(1.19) (-1.41) (2.13) (-2.25) 
0 to +17 9.45% -25.93% 18.41%** -44.33%** 
(1.16) (-1.42) (2.08) (-2.23) 
0 to +18 9.70% -38.75%* 20.13%** -58.88%*** 
(1.13) (-1.79) (2.23) (-2.70) 
0 to +19 12.29% -40.41%* 22.42%** -62.83%*** 
(1.41) (-2.06) (2.41) (-2.75) 
0 to +20 13.81% -38.82%* 23.93%** -62.76%*** 
(1.57) (-1.87) (2.57) (-2.72) 
0 to +21 16.03%* -38.79%* 26.57%*** -65.36%*** 
(1.81) (-1.83) (2.85) (-2.82) 
0 to +22 14.30% -36.76%* 23.47%** -60.22%** 
(1.66) (-1.98) (2.53) (-2.58) 
0 to +23 17.38%* -28.52% 25.62%*** -54.14%** 
(1.94) (-1.40) (2.66) (-2.22) 
0 to +24 17.26%* -26.09% 24.48%** -50.56%* 
(1.87) (-1.27) (2.45) (-1.95) 
0 to +25 15.82% -35.24% 24.33%** -59.57%** 
(1.63) (-1.67) (2.32) (-2.20) 
0 to +26 18.55%* -26.87% 25.03%** -51.91%* 
(1.81) (-1.19) (2.25) (-1.69) 
0 to +27 20.19%* -35.16% 28.09%** -63.26%** 
(1.89) (-1.63) (2.42) (-1.99) 
0 to +28 15.65% -41.90% 23.87%* -65.78%* 
(1.40) (-1.70) (1.98) (-1.98) 
0 to +29 14.81% -57.14% 24.27%** -81.41%** 
(1.30) (-1.83) (2.04) (-2.35) 
0 to +30 16.84% -54.35%* 26.21%** -80.55%** 
(1.49) (-1.92) (2.20) (-2.34) 
0 to +31 14.31% -60.11%* 22.25%* -82.36%** 
(1.28) (-1.99) (1.92) (-2.23) 
0 to +32 19.11%* -54.14%* 27.03%** -81.17%** 
(1.71) (-1.99) (2.30) (-2.20) 
0 to +33 19.33%* -56.14% 27.49%** -83.63%** 
(1.79) (-1.87) (2.47) (-2.37) 
0 to +34 21.16%* -58.41% 29.76%** -88.17%** 
(1.90) (-1.80) (2.60) (-2.42) 
0 to +35 19.40%* -67.75% 27.65%** -95.39%** 
(1.73) (-1.85) (2.43) (-2.46) 
0 to +36 17.88% -72.58% 25.32%** -97.89%** 
(1.5) (-1.76) (2.09) (-2.23) 
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Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired 
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
0 to +37 20.44%* -68.26% 27.83%** -96.09%** 
(1.79) (-1.63) (2.42) (-2.31) 
0 to +38 19.51%* -103.49%** 28.05%** -131.54%*** 
(1.70) (-3.12) (2.45) (-2.97) 
0 to +39 19.85%* -105.73%** 28.57%** -134.30%*** 
(1.77) (-3.29) (2.57) (-3.12) 
0 to +40 21.2%* -107.11%** 30.11%*** -137.22%*** 
(1.91) (-3.33) (2.75) (-3.23) 
0 to +41 20.51%* -117.52% 28.18%** -145.69%*** 
(1.79) (-2.30) (2.53) (-2.99) 
0 to +42 16.00% -149.73%** 25.2%** -174.93%*** 
(1.38) (-3.61) (2.27) (-3.64) 
0 to +43 14.62% -163.17%** 24.77%** -187.95%*** 
(1.20) (-3.30) (2.16) (-3.80) 
0 to +44 14.38% -172.60%** 25.06%** -197.66%*** 
(1.14) (-3.24) (2.11) (-3.87) 
0 to +45 13.51% -188.21%** 25.2%** -213.41%*** 
(1.06) (-3.34) (2.15) (-4.22) 
0 to +46 15.64% -168.95% 23.67%* -192.61%*** 
(1.24) (-2.19) (1.97) (-3.24) 
0 to +47 17.96% -125.67% 22.38%* -148.06%** 
(1.42) (-1.06) (1.81) (-2.05) 
0 to +48 15.49% -124.91% 19.81% -144.71%** 
(1.23) (-1.02) (1.62) (-2.01)  
0 to +49 19.72% -119.31% 24.06%* -143.37%* 
(1.55) (-1.00) (1.93) (-1.97) 
0 to +50 17.99% -120.28% 22.31%* -142.59%* 
(1.37) (-1.04) (1.72) (-1.89) 
0 to +51 16.69% -115.78% 20.90% -136.67%* 
(1.25) (-1.00) (1.58) (-1.79) 
0 to +52 15.15% -115.03% 19.28% -134.31%* 
(1.11) (-1.01) (1.43) (-1.73) 
0 to +53 16.55% -112.24% 20.64% -132.88%* 
(1.20) (-0.99) (1.51) (-1.69) 
0 to +54 20.86% -222.34% 24.72%* -247.06%** 
(1.49)  (1.81) (-2.26) 
0 to +55 17.15% -215.28% 20.90% -236.18%** 
(1.21)  (1.51) (-2.15) 
0 to +56 18.98% -227.51% 22.96% -250.46%** 
(1.31)  (1.63) (-2.24) 
0 to +57 23.64% -229.84% 27.87%* -257.71%** 
(1.56)  (1.89) (-2.24) 
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Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired 
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
0 to +58 23.83% -248.96% 28.37%* -277.33%** 
(1.57)  (1.93) (-2.42) 
0 to +59 31.05%**  31.05%*  
(2.08)  (2.08)  








































Table 16: BHAR to unsuccessful targets – Matching firms with MKT&B/M&INDUSTRY 
Table 16 represents the WHOLE table of percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to 
the unsuccessful targets in time windows in total sample, “subsequently acquired within 5 years” 
and “not acquired within 5 years” subsamples. BHARi(t,T)= ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1   - ∏ (1 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡) is used to calculate BHAR. The 10 firms, which are not only in the same industry 
with the unsuccessful target but also have closest market value to the unsuccessful target’s 1 year 
before announcement of the tender offers, are chosen first. Then among those 10 firms, the one 
with closest book/market value 1 year before announcement to the target firm’s is selected as the 
benchmark for each unsuccessful target. Column 5 is the comparison of the BHAR to the 




Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired 
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
 
0 to 0 32.47%*** 34.51%*** 29.32%*** 5.19% 
(14.19) (12.06) (7.74) (1.11) 
0 to +1 33.94%*** 38.74%*** 26.65%*** 12.1%** 
(13.14) (10.91) (7.56) (2.31) 
0 to +2 29.77%*** 34.84%*** 23.15%*** 11.69%** 
(10.67) (9.03) (5.92) (2.09) 
0 to +3 26.97%*** 33.09%*** 19.78%*** 13.3%** 
(9.40) (8.34) (4.89) (2.34) 
0 to +4 26.03%*** 30.35%*** 21.61%*** 8.74% 
(7.88) (6.10) (5.02) (1.33) 
0 to +5 24.92%*** 28.22%*** 22.03%*** 6.20% 
(6.81) (5.23) (4.42) (0.84) 
0 to +6 22.54%*** 24.55%*** 20.96%*** 3.59% 
(5.69) (3.94) (4.08) (0.45) 
0 to +7 19.44%*** 18.40%** 20.14%*** -1.74% 
(4.62) (2.51) (3.97) (-0.20) 
0 to +8 15.87%*** 12.63% 17.79%*** -5.16% 
(3.5) (1.51) (3.38) (-0.55) 
0 to +9 15.78%*** 16.21%* 15.57%*** 0.65% 
(3.22) (1.69) (2.78) (0.06) 
0 to +10 15.66%*** 15.89% 15.55%*** 0.34% 
(3.18) (1.62) (2.78) (0.03) 
0 to +11 13.60%*** 17.00% 12.14%** 4.86% 
(2.65) (1.67) (2.05) (0.43) 
0 to +12 15.3%*** 17.68% 14.34%** 3.34% 
(2.75) (1.60) (2.23) (0.27) 
0 to +13 12.15%** 4.23% 14.97%** -10.74% 
(2.22) (0.41) (2.31) (-0.86) 
0 to +14 12.21%** -5.58% 17.57%** -23.15% 








Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired 
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
 
0 to +15 10.37% -6.85% 15.47%** -22.32% 
(1.60) (-0.58) (2.04) (-1.45) 
0 to +16 11.38% -7.77% 16.89%** -24.66% 
(1.61) (-0.63) (2.03) (-1.46) 
0 to +17 13.88%* -5.45% 18.72%** -24.16% 
(1.82) (-0.37) (2.14) (-1.27) 
0 to +18 11.96% -16.68% 18.04%* -34.72% 
(1.43) (-0.93) (1.94) (-1.59) 
0 to +19 11.11% -18.73% 16.78%* -35.51% 
(1.35) (-0.95) (1.87) (-1.59) 
0 to +20 11.27% -17.20% 16.68%* -33.88% 
(1.36) (-0.93) (1.83) (-1.51) 
0 to +21 10.84% -18.00% 16.32%* -34.32% 
(1.27) (-0.91) (1.75) (-1.49) 
0 to +22 8.82% -18.45% 13.66% -32.11% 
(1.02) (-0.92) (1.44) (-1.34) 
0 to +23 7.78% -19.32% 12.58% -31.90% 
(0.88) (-0.91) (1.31) (-1.30) 
0 to +24 11.76% -19.78% 16.95%* -36.73% 
(1.29) (-0.98) (1.69) (-1.41) 
0 to +25 10.26% -28.68% 16.66% -45.34% 
(1.03) (-1.38) (1.53) (-1.61) 
0 to +26 13.83% -18.04% 18.32% -36.36% 
(1.37) (-0.92) (1.65) (-1.19) 
0 to +27 9.73% -22.50% 14.27% -36.77% 
(0.95) (-1.03) (1.28) (-1.19) 
0 to +28 5.86% -19.61% 9.45% -29.06% 
(0.56) (-0.85) (0.83) (-0.92) 
0 to +29 5.13% -31.10% 9.84% -40.93% 
(0.50) (-1.18) (0.89) (-1.28) 
0 to +30 5.39% -27.61% 9.67% -37.28% 
(0.50) (-1.11) (0.84) (-1.12) 
0 to +31 8.13% -18.28% 10.95% -29.23% 
(0.76) (-0.59) (0.96) (-0.8) 
0 to +32 11.08% -20.55% 14.50% -35.05% 
(1.01) (-0.70) (1.24) (-0.95) 
0 to +33 11.61% -18.63% 14.88% -33.51% 
(1.07) (-0.60) (1.29) (-0.91) 
0 to +34 12.96% -18.31% 16.34% -34.65% 
(1.18) (-0.53) (1.40) (-0.93) 
0 to +35 12.84% -21.25% 16.06% -37.31% 
(1.12) (-0.57) (1.33) (-0.91) 
 76 
 




Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired 
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
 
0 to +36 13.29% -15.89% 15.69% -31.58% 
(1.14) (-0.32) (1.30) (-0.71) 
0 to +37 15.03% -14.11% 17.46% -31.57% 
(1.26) (-0.29) (1.41) (-0.70) 
0 to +38 14.57% -43.16% 18.58% -61.74% 
(1.26) (-0.80) (1.59) (-1.33) 
0 to +39 14.90% -44.30% 19.01%* -63.32% 
(1.39) (-0.87) (1.75) (-1.46) 
0 to +40 18.93%* -28.16% 22.2%** -50.36% 
(1.80) (-0.49) (2.10) (-1.18) 
0 to +41 15.96% -82.29% 21.42%** -103.71%** 
(1.49) (-1.57) (2.01) (-2.21) 
0 to +42 15.30% -76.61% 20.41%* -97.02%** 
(1.41) (-1.52) (1.88) (-2.04) 
0 to +43 16.26% -75.70% 21.52%** -97.21%** 
(1.51) (-1.38) (2.01) (-2.09) 
0 to +44 16.27% -90.94% 22.39%** -113.33%** 
(1.45) (-1.52) (2.03) (-2.35) 
0 to +45 14.85% -97.58% 21.47%* -119.05%** 
(1.26) (-1.65) (1.84) (-2.38) 
0 to +46 18.87% -116.13% 22.84%* -138.97%* 
(1.54) (-0.84) (1.91) (-1.92) 
0 to +47 19.97% -111.72% 24.08%* -135.80%* 
(1.54) (-0.76) (1.91) (-1.83) 
0 to +48 17.67% -110.66% 21.68%* -132.34%* 
(1.39) (-0.76) (1.75) (-1.81) 
0 to +49 20.46% -98.32% 24.23%* -122.54%* 
(1.63) (-0.70) (1.98) (-1.72) 
0 to +50 22.31% -104.20% 26.32%** -130.53%* 
(1.83) (-0.84) (2.21) (-1.88) 
0 to +51 20.36% -89.47% 23.9%* -113.38% 
(1.65) (-0.75) (1.96) (-1.62) 
0 to +52 19.77% -95.26% 23.48%* -118.75% 
(1.55) (-0.77) (1.87) (-1.64) 
0 to +53 20.10% -95.29% 23.82%* -119.11% 
(1.49) (-0.74) (1.78) (-1.55) 
0 to +54 25.28%* -233.93% 29.46%** -263.39%** 
(1.70)  (2.04) (-2.29) 
0 to +55 23.95% -63.42% 28.17%* -261.54%** 
(1.57)  (1.89) (-2.23) 
0 to +56 20.24% -61.17% 24.35% -254.89%** 
(1.30)  (1.60) (-2.12) 
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Total sample Subsequently 
acquired within 
5 years (1) 
Not acquired 
within 5 years(2) 
(1) – (2) 
 
0 to +57 16.30% -65.16% 20.33% -241.60%** 
(1.04)  (1.33) (-2.03) 
0 to +58 19.82% -66.76% 23.97% -248.76%* 
(1.19)  (1.46) (-1.95) 
0 to +59 25.11% -68.06% 25.11%  
(1.51)  (1.51)  
0 to +60 19.25%  19.25%  
(1.17) (1.17) 
 
 
 
